# Ethanol 1AC

**Contention One – Oil Dependence**

**Plan’s key to supplement corn ethanol – most effective method to reduce oil dependence – superior efficiency, emissions, cost, potential, convenience to oil – other alternatives don’t solve**

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Note that the USA produces about 11% and consumes about 25% of world demand. Recent increases are attributable largely to growing economies in China, India, and other developing countries. At the current rate of worldwide oil consumption, the above worldwide oil reserves equate to about 44 years of production. Of course, total proved reserves includes both developed and undeveloped reserves, and a substantial portion of the total proved reserves have yet to be developed and produced. Such development and production will require considerable expenditures. For economic reasons, therefore, we have tended generally to have somewhere in the range of 10-15 years of developed and producing reserves at any time. Of course, we cannot accurately determine the amount of reserves present until they are developed and produced, but these estimates are developed using reasonable methodologies. What must be understood is that this does not mean we have 10 or 15 or 44 years before the oil runs out. The “peak oil” question must be addressed when new discoveries start to run out, but that has not been the case yet. However, at some point **the question of how long we can continue to rely on oil must be faced.** Given that the 44 years of reserves identified above represent what has been found with technology to date, and that **finding new reserves is becoming technologically more difficult and substantially more expensive, it is not unreasonable to infer from the above that the era of relatively cheap oil will be over** within something approaching 50 years, and therefore **we need to be migrating away from oil in earnest** by that time. **The problem with migrating away from oil is that it has proved to be very difficult to find a reasonable alternative to oil.** Sandalow has identified ten key facts about oil, each with an important implication, as follows (Sandalow, 2008): One reason that **oil** is so hard to replace is that it **is a relatively efficient energy source**. Cleveland, Costanza, Hall, and Kaufmann compared the “energy profit ratio” of various renewable and nonrenewable energy sources (Cleveland, et al, 1984), and Howard T. Odum compared the “energy yield ratio” (Odum, 1976). Their findings were summarized by Richard Heinberg (Heinberg, 2006, pp 162-164). **Oil has yield rates in the range of 8** to 11 and natural gas in the range of 7 to 10, with coal even higher. **Among alternatives,** only **sugar cane ethanol** (**8.3** to 10.2, per Goettemoeller, 2007), 100-year growth rainforest (12.0 per Odum), hydroelectric (11.2 per Cleveland and 10.0 per Odum), solar photovoltaics (1.7 to 10.0, per Cleveland), geothermal from hot dry rock (1.9 to 13.0 per Cleveland and 13.0 per Odum), and tidal electric with a 25-foot tide range (15.0 per Odum). The **fossil fuels** (oil, natural gas, coal) as a group **produce significantly higher energy profit ratios or energy yield ratios than do most green alternatives. This differential is typically reflected in price; we depend so heavily on oil, and to a lesser extent on other fossil fuels, because they provide more energy cheaper than do the currently available alternatives. One barrier to alternative energy sources is that the cost of those alternatives is higher than the cost of oil. However, the cost of oil is also rising. As time passes, we are still making significant discoveries** (such as Brazil’s finds in the Campos, Santos, and Espirito Santo basins) **and as prices rise so will oil supplies, as some known reservoirs are economically viable to produce only at higher prices. But we appear to have found most of the “easy” oil, and what is discovered in the future can reasonably be expected to be more expensive to produce.** Green, Jones, and Leiby, in a 1995 report prepared for the Office of Transportation Technology of the United States Department of Energy, forecasted that “in the long run the net price of oil (price minus marginal extraction costs) will rise steadily at the rate of interest” (Green, et al, 1995, p. 5). Since that time, **oil prices have fluctuated wildly but the overall trend is clearly upward.** The Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE/EIA) prepares an annual energy report and forecast with projections of future energy supply and demand, specifically projecting supply and demand components for 2020 and 2030. The 2007 and 2009 forecasts (DOE/EIA, 2007 and DOE/EIA, 2009) can be compared as follows (reference case, volumes in quadrillion Btu/year): The 2009 forecast differs from the 2007 forecast primarily in that it considers the impact of the decline in energy consumption during the latter half of 2008. Although both forecasts predict an increase in domestic oil and gas production as well as energy from other source, both forecasts leave the U.S. very much dependent on foreign oil as far into the future as 2030. President Barack **Obama has stated, "And for the sake of our economy, our security, and the future of our planet, I will set a clear goal as president: In 10 years, we will finally end our dependence on oil from the Middle East** (Obama, 8/28/2008).” **Unfortunately, it does not appear that the energy program outline by President Obama will accomplish that goal. Efforts to develop wind, solar, and improved insulation for buildings will have minimal impacts on oil usage.** Perhaps the signature element—the electric automobile—is now coming into use, with a goal of 1 million on the road by 2015 (Obama, 1/25/2011). Assuming that each electric vehicle saves 4 gallons of gasoline per day, achieving that goal would reduce current oil consumption by about 200,000 barrels per day, or less than 1 percent. It is entirely likely that on the current path, the US will import more oil in 2015 than today, thus continuing the trend of the last 40 years of becoming ever more dependent on foreign oil. To date, the US has fallen far short of its intended goal of reducing its dependency on foreign oil. In fact that **dependency has increased** rather than decreased. It is the opinion of the authors that this results from three flaws in the US approach:  There has been a focus on developing a perfect solution in a laboratory environment and then implementing it, rather than making use of what is available.  Particularly with respect to oil, the perfect alternative has not been found, nor at this point is there any strong suggestion of what it might be.  **Regulations have hampered many private sector efforts to develop solutions. As a result the US finds itself in a position where it must address two potentially negative factors:  The era of cheap energy is coming to an end.  We currently have no good substitute**s **for oil.** THE APPROACH TAKEN BY BRAZIL **Brazil**, which was even more dependent on foreign oil than was the U.S. in the 1970s, **is today virtually energy-independent**. Because of transportation considerations and difficulties refining heavy oil, Brazil does import some oil, primarily from Bolivia (although that is expected to change once production in the offshore Campos, Santos, and Espirito Santo basins is up to speed), but it exports sufficient oil to be a net exporter of energy. Brazil is now among the ten largest suppliers of oil to the USA. Clearly, the Brazilian economy in general, and its energy consumption in particular, is significantly smaller than in the USA, so some lessons are not strictly applicable. However, **Brazil clearly did some things better than the U.S., and there are some broad general principles that have significant applicability. Brazil’s well-known and massive effort to develop alternatives to gasoline** (**sugar cane ethanol**) and diesel fuel (soybean-based biodiesel) **has replaced approximately 50% of gasoline** and 44% of the country’s on-the-road motor fuel. It should be noted that criticism that Brazil has destroyed the Amazon basin to produce ethanol is unfounded. Sugar cane is produced in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goias, Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, Parana, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, and Sergipe. The area with maximum potential for expansion lies in the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goias. All these areas lie outside the Amazon basin (Lachlau, Sergio Andre, in Schwind, 2007). Further, it is estimated that approximately 65% of the area now producing sugar cane was converted from pasture land before. Brazil does also produce a significant amount of biodiesel, primarily from soybeans, and a considerable amount of soybean production does take place in areas that have been cleared in the Amazon basin. What may be less well known is that Brazil’s approach also included significant amounts of increased domestic exploration for oil and gas (the source of the other 56% of motor fuel) and hydroelectric (35% of Brazil’s total energy needs). Today Petrobras is perhaps the world’s leading center of expertise in deep water drilling. This has resulted in significant new finds in the offshore Santos, Campos and Espirito Santo basins. While Brazil’s recoverable reserves of oil and gas are less than those of the U.S., they are growing rapidly, and continued development could transform Brazil into one of the largest oil producers in the world (DOE/EIA, Brazil country brief, 2011). This emphasis on a broad frontal attack on the problem from all sources was accompanied by a strong bias in favor of action, specifically action utilizing known technology rather than waiting for future technologies to prove themselves. The ethanol plants are themselves relatively primitive, particularly when compared to a U.S. oil refinery (Schwind, 2007). Brazil has refused to become slave to “perfect” or to allow “perfect” to become the worst enemy of “good enough.” This is quite a contrast to the U.S. effort, where there has been considerable research into a “perfect” solution, but comparatively little effort to get “good enough” solutions implemented. Brazil’s approach also included a heavy orientation toward the private sector and free markets. Realizing that as a government-owned entity, Petrobras would likely be too bureaucratic and not sufficiently nimble to respond as needed, the government sold a large stake in the company and passed management duties and privileges to the non-government shareholders. Brazil moved further toward a free-market approach by ending Petrobras’s exclusive concession to develop all domestic oil and gas, and invited foreign companies to come in and take down exploration and production concessions. The mechanisms whereby sugar growers determine whether to sell there produce for making into sugar or into ethanol, and similarly the mechanisms whereby motorists decide whether to burn gasoline or ethanol in their autos (which are set up to burn either) rely almost entirely upon free-market principles. The sugar cane grower compares the prices he can receive at the sugar mill and at the ethanol plant before deciding where to sell his crop. Because automobiles and trucks are configured to run on either gasoline/diesel or ethanol/bio-diesel, the motorist can check the price of each, adjust for performance differential, and make a rational economic decision which one she should put into her vehicle today. Using sugar cane ethanol as the “swing” product introduces some price elasticity to both sugar and oil. While the sugar market is depressed today, lower sugar prices mean that farmers will deliver more sugar cane to the ethanol plant, and **ethanol prices give** some **insulation against oil**—and resulting gasoline—**price shocks.** The lessons to be learned from the Brazilian experience may be summarized as follows: Table 8 United States Of America Brazil The U.S. has debated the question of “drill here, drill now” versus alternatives versus conservation. The emphasis has been on debate and discussion rather than action. Brazil pursued all available options vigorously and simultaneously. The Brazilian approach has been “drill here, drill now” plus alternatives plus conservation. There has been a strong bias toward action. The U.S. has focused upon developing the “perfect” solution in the laboratory and then bringing that solution to reality. Brazil utilized existing technology to the maximum extent possible, and phased in improved technologies as they make the transition from laboratory to real world usefulness. Brazil has vigorously avoided letting “perfect” get in the way of “good enough”. The U.S. government has maintained an adversarial stance toward the energy industry, and has sought to regulate its activities heavily. Brazil has pushed toward a more cooperative approach with the energy industry, and generally allowed the free market to work. APPLYING THE LESSONS FROM BRAZIL TO THE UNITED STATES These **lessons learned from Brazil can be applied to address the USA’s energy problems.** Conservation, alternatives, and increased production from conventional domestic sources must be accompanied by vigorous research and development effort. Rather than wait for perfect technology to be developed, the timing is such that we need to implement some “good enough” steps today. Participation by the private sector in an energy market that sends the right price signals is the fastest way to make real progress; this requires a more cooperative, rather than adversarial, relationship with government, and efforts to ensure that free markets send the proper economic signals. The good news is that a solution appears possible. The bad news is that it will not be cheap. The era of cheap energy is over. Pursuing All Available Options Pursuing all available options means that conservation, alternative fuels, and increased production of domestic fuel—fossil and non-fossil—must be accomplished vigorously and simultaneously. Conservation The potential to “find” energy by saving it through conservation is enormous. The USA currently consumes 68.672 barrels of oil per day per 1,000 people, compared to Europe’s 29.42 barrels of oil per day per 1,000 people. Of particular note is that several European countries are able to maintain GDP per capita at, near, or above US levels, with significantly lower energy consumption: Admittedly, Europe has some advantages over the USA, which enable Europeans to use less energy:  Europe is more compact, with less distance between population centers.  Europe has generally better rail and public transit systems.  European homes are generally much smaller, requiring less energy to heat and cool.  Because Europe is so much further north, European summers are cooler, requiring less air conditioning, but this is offset somewhat because European winters are generally cooler, requiring more energy to heat. At the same time, these data suggest considerable potential for improvement. If the USA reduced its oil consumption to European levels, it would require no imports of oil from sources outside NAFTA. More realistically, a report prepared in 2005 for the Natural Resources Defense Council suggested that the United States could save an average of 2.5 million barrels per day by 2015 (Bordetsky, 2005). The proposed approach includes:  Providing tax incentives to auto manufacturers to retool to build more energy-efficient vehicles  Increasing the Corporate Adjusted Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards  Requiring replacement tires and motor oil to be at least as fuel efficient as original equipment tires and motor oil;  Requiring efficiency improvements in heavy-duty trucks;  Supporting smart growth and better transportation choices.  Expanding industrial efficiency programs to focus on oil use reduction and adopting standards for petroleum heating;  Replacing chemical feedstocks with bioproducts through research and development and government procurement of bioproducts; Upgrading air traffic management systems so aircraft follow the most-efficient routes; and  Promoting residential energy savings with a focus on oil-heat. Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer has proposed a revenue-neutral consumption tax on gasoline to encourage conservation (Krauthammer, 2009). The principle behind this proposal is that a substantial tax be added to the price of motor fuel, with an offsetting reduction in the payroll tax. A driver who drove a lesser number of miles, or utilized a more fuel-efficient vehicle, than the standard would realize a net income from this approach. A variation of this approach is that revenue neutrality should apply to a majority of the tax, with the remainder comprising a net revenue stream that could be used to fund alternatives or research or infrastructure to reduce the use of oil. The savings resulting from the imposition of such a tax are not easily quantifiable, but reductions in consumption in response to the 2008 price spike would suggest that this could save at least 1 million barrels a day. **Alternatives** In the long run, the development of green energy technology **will make the biggest difference in** reducing or **eliminating** our **dependence** up**on** foreign, and even domestic, **oil.** The United States’ energy policy needs a more forceful approach to making alternative energy sources mainstream (Toal, 2008). **Oil** is a natural resource and **will deplete** in time and as the problem of global warming becomes more severe, the need for alternative fuel becomes more and more imperative (Luchansky & Monks, 2009). Unfortunately, in the short run all alternative fuels suffer from two basic shortcomings:  Because the vast majority of oil is used for transportation, translating alternative energy into an alternative for oil is a difficult proposition.  Alternatives compare poorly to traditional energy sources in at least one of the following areas: o Scale o Infrastructure o Price The relevant question, as stated by Richard Heinberg, ultimately becomes, “To what degree can any given non-petroleum energy source, or combination of sources enable industrial civilization to survive the end of oil?” (Heinberg, 2006, p.138) Heinberg further notes that the advantages of oil as an energy commodity, and by implication the disadvantages of alternatives, are that oil is:  Easily transported (liquid fuels are more easily transported than solids such as coal or gases such as methane, and may be carried in ships far more easily than can be gases);  Energy-dense (gasoline contains roughly 40 kilowatt-hours per gallon);  Capable of being refined into several fuels (including gasoline, kerosene, and diesel fuel) suitable for a variety of applications; and  Suitable for a variety of uses (including transportation, heating, and the production of chemicals and other materials) Because of the above limitations, the use of alternatives must be managed very carefully to obtain maximum advantage. As noted above, Brazil gets 50% of its “gasoline” and over 40% of its motor fuels from Biofuels. An equivalent ratio here would mean somewhere between 5 and 6 million barrels per day from Biofuels. That level is clearly achievable, with relatively inexpensive modifications to automobiles to enable flex fuel operations. The US currently gets about 1 million barrels a day from **corn ethanol**, and **further growth expectations for that market are limited. The quickest possibility of a material impact** probably **lies with sugarcane ethanol from Latin America.** Estimates are that as much as **10% of world gasoline usage could be replaced with sugar cane ethanol using current technology** (Goldemberg, 2007). Ron **Soligo** has **estimated the potential** for sugar cane ethanol from Latin America **to be** 2.5 to **3 million barrels per day**, depending on amount of land dedicated and yields obtained (Soligo and Jaffe, 2008). **If** the **trade sanctions with Cuba were lifted,** Juan Tomás Sanchez of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy estimates that **Cuba** alone **could supply** up to **3.2 billion gallons of ethanol annually** (200,000 barrels/day, or 1% of total U.S. energy consumption), while Cuba expert Jorge Hernandez Fonseca projects a more modest production figure around 2 billion gallons per year (Elledge, 2009). The difficulty arises because the current sanctions make the acquisition of accurate information more difficult. Since Cuban sugar production has declined from 44 million tons/year in 1950 to 11 million tons/year today (Zuurbier, 2008), significant upside potential is obvious. These impacts are substantially larger than any other steps under consideration, except perhaps the “drill here, drill now” option. We would still be **importing, but it would be from countries that are closer and have more in common than areas in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world. The existence of a new cash crop in Latin America could dramatically improve their economies, reducing the pressure from illegal immigration, and could also provide farmers with an alternative to marijuana, cocaine, and other plants that are the source of many drugs currently being smuggled into the U.S. Moreover, the ability to use ethanol as a substitute for gasoline would introduce** at least some **elasticity** in**to** the gasoline **consumption** model, there**by limiting the exposure to oil price shocks in the future.** The EPA estimates that use of **sugar cane ethanol could reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 61%**, compared to 21% for corn ethanol (EPA, 2011). Additional ethanol supplies could be obtained from domestic sugar cane and sugar beets. Estimating the potential production from these sources is difficult, but perhaps another 500,000 barrels per day would be possible. That would mean a total of 4 million barrels per day from ethanol, slightly less than the 40% number, but a significant reduction in oil consumption. Additionally, **this would enable** the installation of significant **ethanol infrastructure now, to be in place** already **when** more exotic **forms of ethanol, like cellulosic, become commercially viable.** Incurring those **costs now would** actually **reduce the commercial viability threshold for the exotic sources of ethanol, as they become available.** The arguments against importing ethanol to add to domestic production center around the negative point that the US would still be importing. However, several counter-arguments should be kept in mind:  The proposed approach makes full use of domestic ethanol production capability, so **no domestic enterprise is harmed.**  Importing from Central America, the Caribbean, and South America places our energy supplies in far less jeopardy than importing from Asia and Africa.  The development of an additional lucrative cash crop would aid Latin American economies; in addition to being a good neighbor, the US should also see some relief with its drug and immigration issues along its southern border.  **Ethanol would be the first true alternative to oil**, and having it developed commercially in sufficient volumes would offer some elasticity to the oil-pricing problem, and provide some leverage against oil price spikes.

2008 proves high oil prices discourage consumer spending and cause inflation – cheap alt energy is key to prevent global economic collapse and promote growth

**Rubin, 12** (Jeff Rubin is a Canadian economist and author. He is a former chief economist at CIBC World Markets. Rubin had worked at CIBC World Markets and its predecessors since 1988, and served as chief economist from 1992 to 2009, “How High Oil Prices Will Permanently Cap Economic Growth,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-23/how-high-oil-prices-will-permanently-cap-economic-growth.html>, Sep 23, 2012)

**For most of the last century, cheap oil powered global economic growth. But in the last decade, the price of oil has quadrupled, and that shift will permanently shackle the growth potential of the world’s economies. The countries guzzling the most oil are taking the biggest hits to potential economic growth. That’s sobering news for the U.S., which consumes almost a fifth of the oil used in the world every day. Not long ago, when oil was $20 a barrel, the U.S. was the locomotive of global economic growth;** the federal government was running budget surpluses; the jobless rate at the beginning of the last decade was at a 40-year low. **Now, growth is stalled, the** [**deficit**](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FDEBOGDP:IND) **is more than $1 trillion** and almost 13 million Americans are unemployed. **And the U.S. isn’t the only country getting squeezed. From Europe to** [**Japan**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/japan/)**, governments are struggling to restore growth. But the economic remedies being used are doing more harm than good, based as they are on a fundamental belief that economic growth can return to its former strength. Central bankers and policy makers have fail**ed **to** fully **recognize the suffocating impact of $100**-a-barrel **oil.** Running huge budget deficits and keeping borrowing costs at record lows are only compounding current problems. **These policies cannot be long-term substitutes for cheap oil because an economy can’t grow if it can no longer afford to burn the fuel on which it runs.** The end of growth means governments will need to radically change how economies are managed. Fiscal and monetary policies need to be recalibrated to account for slower potential growth rates. **Energy Source Oil provides more than a third of the energy we use on the planet every day, more than any other energy source. And you can draw a straight line between oil consumption and gross-domestic- product growth. The more oil we burn, the faster the global economy grows. On average over the last four decades, a 1 percent bump in world oil consumption has led to a 2 percent increase in global GDP. That means if GDP increased 4 percent a year -- as it often did before the 2008 recession -- oil consumption was increasing by 2 percent a year. At $20 a barrel, increasing annual oil consumption by 2 percent seems reasonable enough. At $100 a barrel,** it becomes easier to see how **a 2 percent increase in fuel consumption is enough to make an economy collapse.** Fortunately, the reverse is also true. When our economies stop growing, less oil is needed. For example, after the big decline in 2008, global oil demand actually fell for the first time since 1983. That’s why the best cure for high [oil prices](http://topics.bloomberg.com/oil-prices/) is high oil prices. When prices rise to a level that causes an economic crash, lower prices inevitably follow. **Over the last four decades, each time oil prices have spiked, the global economy has entered a recession.** Consider the first oil shock, after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ Arab members turned off the taps on roughly 8 percent of the world’s oil supply by cutting shipments to the U.S. and other Israeli allies. Crude prices spiked, and by 1974, [real GDP](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/EHGDUSY:IND) in the U.S. had shrunk by 2.5 percent. The second OPEC oil shock happened during Iran’s revolution and the subsequent war with Iraq. Disruptions to Iranian production during the revolution sent crude prices higher, pushing the North American economy into a [recession](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USRINDEX:IND) for the first half of 1980. A few months later, Iran’s war with Iraq shut off 6 percent of world oil production, sending North America into a double-dip recession that began in the spring of 1981. Kuwait Invasion When [Saddam Hussein](http://topics.bloomberg.com/saddam-hussein/) invaded [Kuwait](http://topics.bloomberg.com/kuwait/) a decade later, oil prices doubled to $40 a barrel, an unheard-of level at the time. The first [Gulf War](http://topics.bloomberg.com/gulf-war/) disrupted almost 10 percent of the world’s oil supply, sending major oil-consuming countries into a recession in the fall of 1990. Guess what oil prices were doing in 2008, when the world fell into the deepest recession since the 1930s? From trading around $30 a barrel in 2004, **oil prices marched steadily higher before hitting a peak of $147 a barrel in the summer of 2008. Unlike past oil price shocks, this time there wasn’t even a supply disruption to blame. The spigot was wide open. The problem was, we could no longer afford to buy what was flowing through it. There are many ways an oil shock can hurt an economy. When prices spike, most of us have little choice but to open our wallets. Paying more for oil means we have less cash to spend on food, shelter, furniture, clothes, travel and pretty much anything else. Expensive oil, coupled with the average American’s refusal to drive less, leaves a lot less money for the rest of the economy. Worse, when oil prices go up, so does inflation. And when inflation goes up, central banks respond by raising** [**interest rates**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/interest-rates/) **to keep prices in check.** From 2004 to 2006, U.S. energy inflation ran at 35 percent, according to the [Consumer Price Index](http://topics.bloomberg.com/consumer-price-index/). In turn, overall inflation, as measured by the CPI, accelerated from 1 percent to almost 6 percent. **What happened next was a fivefold bump in interest rates that devastated the massively leveraged U.S. housing market. High**er **rates popped the speculative housing bubble, which brought down the global economy. Unfortunately, this pattern of oil-driven inflation is with us again. And world** [**food prices**](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FAOFOODI:IND) **are being affected.** According to the food-[price index](http://topics.bloomberg.com/price-index/) tracked by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the cost of food rose almost 40 percent from 2009 to the beginning of 2012. And since 2002, the FAO’s food-price index, which measures a basket of five commodity groups (meat, dairy, cereals, oils and fats, and sugar), is up about 150 percent. Food Prices **A double whammy of rising oil and food prices means inflation will be here sooner than anyone would like to think. Rising inflation rates in China and India are a clear signal that those economies are growing at an unsustainable pace. China has made GDP growth of more than 8 percent a priority but needs to recalibrate its thinking to recognize the damping effects of high oil prices.** Growth might not stall entirely, but **clocking double-digit gains is no longer feasible, at least without triggering a calamitous increase in inflation**. If China and India, the new engines of global economic growth, are forced to adopt anti-inflationary monetary policies, the ripple effects for resource-based economies such as [Canada](http://topics.bloomberg.com/canada/), [Australia](http://topics.bloomberg.com/australia/) and [Brazil](http://topics.bloomberg.com/brazil/) will be felt in a hurry. **Triple-digit oil prices will end the lofty economic hopes of India and China**, which are looking to achieve the same sort of sustained growth that [North America](http://topics.bloomberg.com/north-america/) and Europe enjoyed in the postwar era. There is an unavoidable obstacle that puts such ambitions out of reach: Today’s oil isn’t flowing from the same places it did yesterday. More importantly, it’s not flowing at the same cost. **Conventional oil production, the easy-to-get-at stuff from the** [**Middle East**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/middle-east/) **or west Texas, hasn’t increased in more than five years. And that’s with record crude prices giving explorers all the incentive in the world to drill.** According to the [International Energy Agency](http://topics.bloomberg.com/international-energy-agency/), **conventional production has already peaked and is set to decline steadily over the next few decades.** That doesn’t mean there won’t be any more oil. New reserves are being found all the time in new places. What the decline in conventional production does mean, though, is that **future economic growth will be fueled by expensive oil from nonconventional sources such as the** [**tar sands**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/tar-sands/)**, offshore wells in the deep waters of the world’s oceans and even oil shales,** which come with environmental costs that range from carbon-dioxide emissions to potential groundwater contamination. **And even if new supplies are found, what matters to the economy is the cost of getting that supply flowing.** It’s not enough for the global [energy industry](http://topics.bloomberg.com/energy-industry/) simply to find new caches of oil; **the crude must be affordable.** Triple-digit prices make it profitable to tap ever-more-expensive sources of oil, but the prices needed to pull this crude out of the ground will throw our economies right back into a recession. **The energy industry’s task is not simply to find oil, but also to find stuff we can afford to burn. And that’s where the industry is failing. Each new barrel we pull out of the ground is costing us more than the last. The resources may be there for the taking, but our economies are already telling us we can’t afford the cost.**

Sugar cane ethanol solves – extremely efficient

**Newsweek, 7** (Newsweek, “Sugar Rush,” <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/04/15/sugar-rush.html>, April 15, 2007)

He won't be the last. Thanks to global climate change, sugar now is in big demand. The drum-beat of alarm over global warming has set businesses clamoring for a piece of the sugar-cane action. There are plenty of other ways to make ethanol, of course, and scientists the world over are busy tinkering with everything from switchgrass to sweet potatoes. U.S. farmers make it from corn, but with the scarcity of arable land there's just so much they can plant without crowding out other premium crops, like soy beans. (Meantime, **the combination of limited land and surging demand have sent corn prices through the roof**). **So** far **nothing beats sugarcane**—which grows in the tropics—**for an abundant, cheap source of energy**. **Unlike beets or corn**, **which** are confined to temperate zones and **must be transformed into carbohydrates before they can be converted into sugar and finally alcohol, sugarcane is already halfway there**. That means the sugar barons like Ometto spend much less energy than the competition, not to mention money. The moral imperative of finding a substitute for fossil fuels has lent an air of respectability to new ventures to produce biofuels from sugar—a marked contrast to the sugar barons of old, known for their ruthless ways and their appetite for taxpayers' money. "The distillers who ten years ago were the bandits of agribusiness are becoming national and world heroes," Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula declared recently. **"[E]thanol and biodiesel are more than an answer to our dangerous 'addiction' to fossil fuels. This is the beginning of a reassessment of the global strategy to protect our environment."**

Economic collapse causes nuclear war

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Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism. One symptom that makes such a scenario plausible has become visible. Many commentators have identified anger or anxiety as a common driver of the Tea Party movement in the United States and the rise of xenophobic parties in Europe, perhaps stemming from a self-perception of decline. Anger (directed towards the neo-colonialist or pro-Israeli West or – especially recently – domestic authoritarian regimes) has also been associated with grievances in the Middle East, following the failure of earlier reformist and secular movements. 10 Despite relative popular optimism, anger can also be detected in Asia, hand in hand with chauvinism and a sense of lack of appropriate recognition by others, stemming from a self-perception of rising influence and power.

**Their defense lacks causality and statistical backing**

Royal 10 – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, US-Department of Defense, policy advisor (Jedidiah, “Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives”, pg. 212-214; Print.)//Beddow

The counterargument to contagion is the ‘risk-sharing’ argument. It suggests that while trade and financial linkages may spread a crisis, this creates a cushioning effect that, overall, minimizes the effects on any individual state. In other words, interdependence createsshock-absorbing linkages that soften a state’s vulnerability to dramatic economic downturns (see, e.g., Kelemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). Gallegati, Greenwald, Richiardi, and Stiglitz (2008) have made a convincing observation that would appear to clarify this debate. They have provided statistical modeling indicating that risk-sharing and contagion are in fact two sides of the same coin. When economic times are good, inter-linkages provide mechanisms for the diffusion of individual agents that face a liquidity crisis. A leader can request a creditor defer payment, whereas a creditor can then transfer this cost on to other agents. As such the system would absorb the crisis. When liquidity is relatively more scarce during down times, a sufficiently large negative shock will use those very sameinter-linkages to transmit that shock to other agents in the system. As a result, ‘risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall economic environment is favourable, while in harsh times it might be better to stay alone… [linkage during market downturns] becomes socially detrimental; not only is it that the expected number of defaults is higher when the economic agents are connected, but defaults become a systemic failure’ (Gallegati et al., 2008. Pp.5. 16). Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) considered the same question and found only mild support for risk-sharing and only among developed, industrial economies. They found no evidence that developing, non-industrial countries are able to share risk. The authors break relatively new ground in suggesting why this is the case for non-industrial states: One possibility is that these countries rely more on less stable capital such as bank loans and other forms of debt that may not allow for efficient risk sharing. Indeed, we break up stocks of external assets and liabilities into different categories – FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, etc. – we find that the underlying composition of capital flows influences the ability of developing countries to share risk. In particular, external debt appears to hinder the ability of emerging market economies to share their consumption risk. (Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, 2009. P. 259) One reason why interdependent states may not be well-suited to share risk is due to the fact that interdependence leads to economic specialization and reliance on external financing. Gande, John, and Senbet (2008) and Corsetii et al. (1999) provide conceptual and analytical links between specialization, moral hazard, and contagion. Thus, the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between economic interdependence and economic crises. What then about the second question? Is there a positive correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state level are intuitive and well-documented (See, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 197b), among others, argues that the instability in the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict.’ Social unrest, regime changes, and even civil war have directly resultedfrom the vagaries of economic integration. Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding thatrhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the **often**bloody transition**from one pre-eminent leader to the next**. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could user in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) shows **that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers,**although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession lends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-rein force each other. (Blombcrj! & Hess. 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blombcrg. Mess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arr greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

Second, boosting economic competitiveness bolsters hegemony and solves war

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Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep [financial crisis](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad), not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial [tax increases](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance economic growth and employment while cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options. The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications. As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house in order, it should take steps to prevent a flare-up in Asia. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways. While China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can be done. Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery — particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China. Since the end of the Cold War, a stable economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation in combination with the rise of rival powers will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems. Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity.

**Primacy is the mega-impact**

**Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth ‘13**

Stephen Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, John Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, Lean Forward, EBSCO

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. **The** most **obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict**. The **U**nited **S**tates' **security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states.** **Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing** that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, **major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier**. But **that outlook is too sanguine**. **If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China.** It's worth noting that **during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the U**nited **S**tates, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, **were the U**nited **S**tates **to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington**--**notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia**--**might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas**. **There would** even **be reason to worry about Europe.** Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. **The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions** on which U.S. leaders might want European help, **and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers**. **Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition**, **advocates of retrenchment** tend to put forth another **argument**: that such **rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the U**nited **S**tates. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? **Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and** perhaps even **start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the U**nited **S**tates, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. **Greater regional insecurity could** also **produce cascades of nuclear proliferation** as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those **countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals**. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. **As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.** The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. **By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas**, thereby **preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities**. **For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers**: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, **the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons**. Some **supporters of retrenchment argue** that **the U.S.** military **should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers** to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. **Washington**, they contend, **should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises**, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet the**re is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the U**nited **S**tates **will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there**. **The implication is that the U**nited **S**tates **should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing**. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE **Preoccupied with security issues, critics** of the current grand strategy **miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy** and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet **the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership**. In addition to **protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply**. **Were the U**nited **S**tates **to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder**. **Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open.** A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, **the U**nited **S**tates **wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy.** Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. **The U**nited **S**tates' **geopolitical dominance** also **helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country**, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: **it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk.** CREATING COOPERATION **What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation**. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. **In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action**. But **cooperation does not come about effortlessly**, especially when national interests diverge. **The U**nited **S**tates' **military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests**. After all, **cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability**. U.S. **alliances** are about security first, but they also **provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issue**s. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. **Thanks to conduits such as this, the U**nited **S**tates **can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics**. With its alliance system in place, **the U**nited **S**tates **is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens**. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. **Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."** THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet **their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the U**nited **S**tates **would save** much **money** switching to a smaller global posture. **Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked** the formation of **counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline**. **Nor will it condemn the U**nited **S**tates **to foolhardy wars in the future**. **What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these** benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. **A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well** for the past six decades, and **there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know**. **Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could** well **be disastrous**.

**U.S. pursuit of heg is locked-in**

Zach **Dorfman 12**, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, May 18, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>

The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million. U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage. The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

**Contention Two – Brazilian Ecosystems**

Cuban ethanol solves Cerrado Destruction – displaces expansion into Brazilian ecosystems and avoids land conversion concerns

**Specht ‘12**

(Jonathan – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D.,¶ Washington University in St. Louis 2012. “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States” – ExpressO – http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)

B. Environmental Effects of Sugarcane-Based Ethanol **If** future legislation does not revive the United States ethanol tariff that expired at the end of 2011 and **the trade embargo against Cuba is kept in place, Brazil will likely be the primary beneficiary.**109 The argument can be made that Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol is a more environmentally beneficial fuel source than domestic-corn based ethanol, because of the nature of sugarcanebased ethanol (discussed below).110 **Brazilian sugarcane**-based **ethanol comes, however, with** its own set of **environmental consequences.** The full debate over the environmental consequences of the Brazilian biofuel¶ production¶ 111¶ is largely beyond the scope of this Article. Still, the primary issue¶ in this dispute is worth noting, because it accentuates one of the most significant¶ differences between the U.S. corn-based ethanol industry and the potential¶ Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry. In Brazil, the expansion of sugarcane¶ production to meet demand for ethanol production has led to land use changes that parallel the expansion of corn production for ethanol in the United States.¶ Clearing portions of the Amazon rainforest¶ —¶ one of the most significant¶ repositories of carbon on Earth¶ 112¶ —¶ would represent an environmental cost of¶ ethanol production that outweighs its benefits. The Amazon region, however, is¶ largely unsuitable for sugarcane production.¶ 113¶ But, **sugarcane production is**¶ **contributing to destruction of a**nother **sensitive habitat, the bio-diverse Cerrado**¶ savannah **region of Brazil**.¶ 114¶ **Cuban sugar**cane-based **ethanol would have the environmental benefits of**¶ **Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol without its most obvious negative factor,**¶ **damaging habitat in the Cerrado**¶ .¶ The environmental effects of biofuels depend¶ on a number of factors. Whether or not a given type of biofuel is¶ environmentally beneficial “depends on what the fuel is, how and where the¶ biomass was produced, what else the land could have been used for, how the¶ fuel was processed and how it is used.”¶ 115¶ Taken together, these **factors point to**¶ **sugar**cane-based **ethanol grown in Cuba as one of the most environmentally friendly biofuel**s possible. ¶ The environmental benefits of using sugarcane to produce ethanol are¶ numerous. First, it is much more energy efficient to derive ethanol from¶ sugarcane than corn. Making ethanol from corn only creates approximately 1.3¶ times the amount of energy used to produce it, but **making ethanol from¶ sugarcane creates approximately eight times the amount of energy used to produce it.**¶ 116¶ Second, **unlike** much of the **corn** **presently grown in Great Plains¶ states, sugarcane grown in Latin America does not need to be irrigated.¶ 117¶ Third,¶ sugarcane requires relatively small amounts of** chemical fertilizers, herbicides,¶ and **pesticide**s.¶ 118¶ Fourth, **whereas most U.S. ethanol refineries are powered by**¶ **coal or natural gas**,¶ 119¶ **sugar**cane **ethanol refineries can be powered by**¶ **bagasse**¶ , a¶ natural product left over from the sugar refining process.¶ 120¶ In fact, refineries¶ powered with¶ bagasse¶ can even produce more electricity than they need and sell power back to the electric grid.¶ 121¶ Fifth, although corn can only be planted and¶ harvested once a year, in tropical climates sugarcane can be cut from the same¶ stalks multiple times per year.¶ 122¶ Each of these factors in favor of sugarcane ethanol is true of ethanol from¶ Brazil as well as of any potential ethanol from Cuba. However, there are¶ additional environmental factors that clinch Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol as¶ one of the most environmentally friendly fuel sources available to the United¶ States under current technology.¶ 123¶ First, **because Cuba is closer to the United**¶ **States, transporting ethanol from Cuba to the United States would require less**¶ **energy than transporting ethanol from Brazil** to the United States (especially if it¶ is used in Florida, an option further explored in the section on economic¶ effects).¶ 124¶ Another reason Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol could be one of the most¶ environmentally friendly fuels possible is that **Cuba could produce a significant**¶ **amount of ethanol without any negative impacts on native habitat**. A striking¶ amount of **Cuban ag**ricultural **land** — fifty five percent as of 2007 — **is simply¶ lying fallow and is not cultivated** with anything.¶ 125¶ Although its character may¶ have changed due to years of neglect, **this land is not virgin native habitat like**¶ **the** grasslands of North Dakota or the **Cerrado of Brazil**. Cuba therefore could¶ greatly increase its production of sugarcane, and thus its production of¶ sugarcane-based ethanol, without negative impacts on wildlife habitat. While it¶ is not environmentally perfect — no form of energy is — **Cuban sugar**cane-¶ based **ethanol would raise fewer environmental concerns than the fuel sources it**¶ **would displace**: petroleum, domestic **corn-based ethanol, and Brazilian**¶ **sugar**cane based **ethanol.** **Therefore,** from a purely environmental perspective,¶ **changing U.S**. law and **policy** in order **to promote the importation of Cuban**¶ sugarcane-based **ethanol should be encouraged.**

Cerrado’s key to global biod and a *strong carbon sink* – dense vegetation and underground biomass

**Vitali ‘11**

(Isabella Vitali – Senior Policy Officer, WWF-UK.“Soya and the Cerrado: Brazil’s forgotten jewel – http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/soya\_and\_the\_cerrado.pdf)

**Loss of the Cerrado is of global concern** **not only because**¶ **of its significant contribution to the world’s biodiversity,**¶ **but also because of its importance in terms of climate**¶ **change**. **CO2 emissions associated with the conversion**¶ **of the Cerrado are more than half** the total **emissions of the UK** and probably **already exceed those from Amazon**¶ **deforestation**. **Much less well known than its giant neighbour, the Amazon, the** Brazilian **Cerrado** or¶ woodland-savannah **is an extraordinary ecosystem worthy of global attention,**¶ especially in view of the intense pressure it has suffered and continues to suffer.¶ **Originally covering an area larger than Mexico**, more than 2m sq km, **the Cerrado is**¶ **an extremely diverse landscape occupying the entire central part of Brazil,** thought to¶ be a remnant of the ancient continent that existed at the time of the dinosaurs, before¶ the separation of South America and Africa.25¶ Most of the Cerrado is located on the high plateau of the continent. The ecosystem is¶ characterised by a pronounced dry period, between May and September. This leads¶ to fire-prone conditions in the drought season to which vegetation has adapted over¶ millions of years.26¶ Under the umbrella term Cerrado, **the region** actually **consists of a rich mosaic** of¶ contrasting landscapes **that makes this the most biodiverse** savannah **region on the**¶ **planet**. **No fewer than 11 different categories of landscape have been defined**,¶ including three types of forest; four varieties of ‘true’ savannah with shrubs and¶ sparse, twisted trees; and three separate kinds of grassland.27¶ **The diversity** of landscapes leads to a diversity of plantlife that **qualifies the Cerrado**¶ **to be one of the planet’s biodiversity hotspots**, when combined with the threats which¶ it is facing. A recent checklist of vascular (i.e. flowering) plants in the biome¶ identified more than 11,000 species, of which around **44% are endemic** – that is, they¶ appear nowhere else in the world. **The Cerrado is estimated to contain some 5% of**¶ **the entire Earth’s biodiversity**.28¶ **The plant biodiversity and its long adaptation to adverse conditions make Cerrado vegetation of great interest** and potential high value **for** a wide range of human uses,¶ including for **medicines,** novel food **and** potentially even **crops better suited to future**¶ **conditions under climate change.**29¶ Among the charismatic mammal species to be found in the Cerrado are the giant¶ anteater, giant armadillo, maned wolf and jaguar. More than 800 bird species occur¶ in the biome30 – emblematic birds include the Toco toucan, the rhea or South¶ American ostrich, and various species of macaw.¶ Apart from the great biodiversity, the Cerrado’s position on the high plateau of the¶ continent gives it an important role in safeguarding the water resources of a large¶ part of Brazil and neighbouring countries. This has given it the nickname ‘Brazil’s¶ water tank’: of 12 hydrological regions in the country, six have sources in the Cerrado.¶ In the case of three major river basins – the Tocantins/Araguaia, São Francisco and¶ Paraná-Paraguay (La Plata) – more than 70% of the water resources originate in the¶ Cerrado. Although the Amazon River itself starts in the Andes, some 4% of the water¶ in the Amazon basin flows from tributaries originating in the Cerrado.31¶ **The Cerrado** also **has global importance because of the large stock of carbon stored in**¶ **its** vegetation and **soil.** **Although it would appear to be much sparser than the** well-known **carbon store of the Amazon**, **the Cerrado has been described as a forest**¶ **standing on its head, with** about **70% of biomass underground**.32 **Recent studies suggest the carbon stock of trees, bushes, litter, roots and soil may be nearly double the figure given by** the **I**ntergovernmental **P**anel on **C**limate **C**hange (2000), at some¶ 265 tonnes of carbon per hectare.33

Warming is anthropogenic. We need *strong carbon sinks*

**Hu ‘9**

(et al – all authors listed. JIA HU = Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Colorado, Boulder. DAVID J. P. MOORE = Department of Geography, King’s College London. SEANP.BURNS = National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). RUSSELL K . MONSON – Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES), University of Colorado, Boulder. “Longer growing seasons lead to less carbon sequestration by a subalpine forest” – Global Change Biology; http://www.mmm.ucar.edu/people/burns/files/gcb10\_hu\_growingseason.pdf)

Human activities, such as the **burning of fossil fuels** and¶ land use changes, **have increased** the atmospheric **CO2** concentration over the past century. **The increase** in CO¶ 2¶ and other greenhouse gases **is very likely to have caused climate warming** at unprecedented rates (IPCC,¶ 2007). **While** approximately **half of the emitted anthropogenic CO2** **stays in the atmosphere**, **the remainder is assimilated into terrestrial** and ocean **ecosystems** (Ca-¶ nadell¶ et al¶ ., 2007). **These natural carbon sinks are vital for sequestering** atmospheric **CO2** , **and yet the strength** and longevity **of these sinks may be diminishing** (Cramer¶ et al¶ ., 2001; Canadell¶ et al¶ ., 2007**). The tendency for ecosystem growing seasons to lengthen in response to climate warming (**Myneni¶ et al¶ ., 1997; Cao & Wood-¶ ward, 1998; Black¶ et al¶ ., 2000) **may enhance the strength of the terrestrial carbon sink**, **and thus diminish the rate of atmospheric CO2 buildup**. An earlier spring, and¶ associated longer growing season may increase the¶ potential time for photosynthetic CO¶ 2¶ uptake by terres-¶ trial ecosystems.

Runaway CO2 concentration acidifies the oceans—the impact is extinction

**Romm ‘9**

(Joe, a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which **New York Times** columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 “Best Blogs of 2010.″ In 2009, **Rolling Stone** put Romm #88 on its list of 100 “people who are reinventing America.” **Time** named him a “Hero of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger.” Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT, “Imagine a World without Fish: Deadly ocean acidification — hard to deny, harder to geo-engineer, but not hard to stop — is subject of documentary ,” http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2009/09/02/204589/a-sea-change-imagine-a-world-without-fish-ocean-acidification-film/, AM)

Global warming is “capable of wrecking the marine ecosystem and depriving future generations of the harvest of the seas” (see Ocean dead zones to expand, “remain for thousands of years”). A post on ocean acidification from the new Conservation Law Foundation blog has brought to my attention that the first documentary on the subject, *A Sea Change:* Imagine a World without Fish, is coming out. Ocean acidification must be a core climate message, since it **is** hard to deny and **impervious** **to** the delusion that **geoengineering** is the silver bullet. Indeed, a major 2009 study GRL study, “Sensitivity of ocean acidification to geoengineered climate stabilization” (subs. req’d), concluded: The results of this paper support the view that climate engineering will not resolve the problem of ocean acidification, and that therefore deep and rapid cuts in CO2 emissions are likely to be the most effective strategy to avoid environmental damage from future ocean acidification. If you want to understand ocean acidification better, see this BBC story, which explains: **Man-made pollution is raising ocean acidity at least 10 times faster than previously thought**, a study says. Or see this *Science* magazine study, “Evidence for Upwelling of Corrosive “Acidified” Water onto the Continental Shelf” (subs. req’), which found Our results show for the first time that a large section of the North American continental shelf is impacted by ocean acidification. Other continental shelf regions may also be impacted where anthropogenic CO2-enriched water is being upwelled onto the shelf. Or listen to the Australia’s ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, which warns: The world’s oceans are becoming more acid, with potentially devastating consequences for corals and the marine organisms that build reefs and provide much of the Earth’s breathable oxygen. The acidity is caused by the gradual buildup of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, dissolving into the oceans. Scientists fear it could be lethal for animals with chalky skeletons which make up more than a third of the planet’s marine life”¦. Corals and plankton with chalky skeletons are at the base of the marine food web. They rely on sea water saturated with calcium carbonate to form their skeletons. However, as acidity intensifies, the saturation declines, making it harder for the animals to form their skeletal structures (calcify). “Analysis of coral cores shows a steady drop in calcification over the last 20 years,” says Professor Ove Hoegh-Guldberg of CoECRS and the University of Queensland. “There’s not much debate about how it happens: put more CO2 into the air above and it dissolves into the oceans. “When CO2 levels in the atmosphere reach about 500 parts per million, you put calcification out of business in the oceans.” (Atmospheric CO2 levels are presently 385 ppm, up from 305 in 1960.) I’d like to see an analysis of what happens when you get to 850 to 1000+ ppm because that is where we’re headed (see U.S. media largely ignores latest warning from climate scientists: “Recent observations confirm “¦ the worst-case IPCC scenario trajectories (or even worse) are being realised” “” 1000 ppm). The CLF post notes: Dr. Jane Lubchenco, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) warns that an acidic ocean is the “equally evil twin” of climate change. Scott Doney, a senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution noted in a public presentation that “New England is the most vulnerable region in the country to ocean acidification.” In June, dozens of Academies of Science, including ours and China’s, issued a joint statement on ocean acidification, warned “Marine food supplies are likely to be reduced with significant implications for food production and security in regions dependent on fish protein, and human health and wellbeing” and “Ocean acidification is irreversible on timescales of **at least** tens of thousands of years.” They conclude: Ocean acidification is a direct consequence of increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations. To avoid substantial damage to ocean ecosystems, deep and rapid reductions of global CO2 emissions by at least 50% by 2050, and much more thereafter are needed. We, the academies of science working through the InterAcademy Panel on International Issues (IAP), call on world leaders to: “¢ Acknowledge that ocean acidification is a direct and real consequence of increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations, is already having an effect at current concentrations, and is likely to cause **grave harm to important marine ecosystems as CO2 concentrations reach 450 ppm and above;** “¢ Recognise that reducing the build up of CO2 in the atmosphere is the only practicable solution to mitigating ocean acidification; “¢ Within the context of the UNFCCC negotiations in the run up to Copenhagen 2009, recognise the direct threats posed by increasing atmospheric CO2 emissions to the oceans and therefore society, and take action to mitigate this threat; “¢ Implement action to reduce global CO2 emissions by at least 50% of 1990 levels by 2050 and continue to reduce them thereafter. If we want to save life in the oceans “” **and save ourselves**, since we depend on that life “” the time to start slashing carbon dioxide emissions is now.

**Plan**

The United States Federal Government should lift all import restrictions on sugar cane ethanol produced in Cuba and facilitate growth of a Cuban sugar cane ethanol sector through foreign direct investment.

**Contention Three – Solvency**

Cuba would accept FDI for ethanol – Raul is for biofuels

**Posner ‘8**

Andrew Posner – In 2007, Andy was an Environmental Studies Masters student at Brown University. He has gone on to be the Transportation correspondent for Treehugger.com – “Cuba: Can 'Red' Ethanol Be Green?” – Treehugger.com – February 25, 2008 – http://www.treehugger.com/cars/cuba-can-red-ethanol-be-green.html

After 49 years in power, **Fidel** Castro **has stepped aside and allowed** his brother **Raúl,** 76, **to be**come **president**. While hopes that "a younger generation might take power" have been washed away, many still expect to see changes with the "pragmatic military officer" in charge. **One change**s **may come in the form of an ethanol boom in Cuba**, where experts believe as much as 2 billions gallon could one day be produced annually, which would place Cuba third in worldwide production. According to Wired.com,¶ Fidel Castro hated ethanol. He thought it punished the poor by driving up food prices. But Cuba produces a lot of sugar, and **with** Fidel's brother **Raul - a fan of biofuels** - **expected to call the shots, Cuba could become a key player in the global ethanol game.**¶ Of course, **Cuba wouldn't be able to start producing all that ethanol without "a huge investment in Cuba's rickety sugar industry." And doing so will require** the kind of **reform** that has helped make China the powerhouse that it is: **namely, foreign investment. This kind of reform may not be as unlikely as it sounds.** According to a Washington Post article entitled 'End of Castro's Rule Opens Door for Reforms,' "**Cuba's leaders likely will "want to pursue an incremental, gradual approach to reform**" that does not privatize the large state-run sector but allows a new private sector to grow alongside it." Oh, and by the way, **Cuba has been modernizing its ethanol infrastructure, albeit quietly**.

Energy cooperation is key – the plan specifically solves our relations

**Colvin, Jaffe, Soligo 09**

(Jake Colvin- Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council and

directs the Cuba Initiative of USA, Amy Myers Jaffe - research scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, whose focus is on oil geopolitics and strategic energy policy, and Dr. Ronald Soligo - professor of economics at Rice University and a Rice Scholar at the Baker Institute research focuses on economic growth and development and energy economics, “9 WAYS FOR U.S. TO TALK TO CUBA AND FOR CUBA TO TALK TO US”

The Center for Democracy in the Americas (CDA), http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/9-Ways-for-US-to-talk-to-Cuba-and-for-Cuba-to-talk-to-US.pdf)

There are numerous topics of global and mutual interest to talk about. nine **The Center for Democracy in the Americas has identified** **critical areas where Washington and Havana can communicate, work together and build relationships of confidence and trust**.¶ Energy cooperation: The **expertise of the U.S. energy industry could** speed Cuba’s development of abundant untapped oil resources, **increase Cuba’s ability to produce ethanol, boost energy supplies to the U.S., and help Cuba’s economy.¶** Commercial cooperation: **Opportunities for trade and commerce with Cuba would help U.S. firms compete against foreign firms, which operate in Cuba without restrictions, while improving Cuban living standards** and working conditions.¶

# 2AC

## Oil Dependence

**Hegemony is sustainable but the US has to choose to maintain its primacy**

**Kagan 12** (Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, B.A., Yale University, M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D., American University, January 17, 2012, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline”, Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/17-us-power-kagan>)

The challenges today are great, and the rise of China is the most obvious of them. But they are not greater than the challenges the United States faced during the Cold War. Only in retrospect can the Cold War seem easy. Americans at the end of World War II faced a major strategic crisis. The Soviet Union, if only by virtue of its size and location, seemed to threaten vital strategic centers in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. In all these regions, it confronted nations devastated and prostrate from the war. To meet this challenge, the United States had to project its own power, which was great but limited, into each of those regions. It had to form alliances with local powers, some of them former enemies, and provide them with economic, political, and military assistance to help them stand on their own feet and resist Soviet pressure. In the Cold War, the Soviets wielded influence and put pressure on American interests merely by standing still, while the United States had to scramble. It is worth recalling that this strategy of “containment,” now hallowed by its apparent success, struck some influential observers at the time as entirely unworkable. Walter Lippmann attacked it as “misconceived,” based on “hope,” conceding the “strategic initiative” to the Soviets while the United States exhausted its resources trying to establish “satellite states, puppet governments” that were weak, ineffective, and unreliable. Today, in the case of China, the situation is reversed. Although China is and will be much richer, and will wield greater economic influence in the world than the Soviet Union ever did, its geostrategic position is more difficult. World War II left China in a comparatively weak position from which it has been working hard to recover ever since. Several of its neighbors are strong nations with close ties to the United States. It will have a hard time becoming a regional hegemon so long as Taiwan remains independent and strategically tied to the United States, and so long as strong regional powers such as Japan, Korea, and Australia continue to host American troops and bases. China would need at least a few allies to have any chance of pushing the United States out of its strongholds in the western Pacific, but right now it is the United States that has the allies. It is the United States that has its troops deployed in forward bases. It is the United States that currently enjoys naval predominance in the key waters and waterways through which China must trade. Altogether, China’s task as a rising great power, which is to push the United States out of its present position, is much harder than America’s task, which is only to hold on to what it has. Can the United States do that? In their pessimistic mood today, some Americans doubt that it can. Indeed, they doubt whether the United States can afford to continue playing in any part of the world the predominant role that it has played in the past. Some argue that while Paul Kennedy’s warning of imperial overstretch may not have been correct in 1987, it accurately describes America’s current predicament. The fiscal crisis, the deadlocked political system, the various maladies of American society (including wage stagnation and income inequality), the weaknesses of the educational system, the deteriorating infrastructure—all of these are cited these days as reasons why the United States needs to retrench internationally, to pull back from some overseas commitments, to focus on “nation building at home” rather than try to keep shaping the world as it has in the past. Again, these common assumptions require some examination. For one thing, how “overstretched” is the United States? The answer, in historical terms, is not nearly as much as people imagine. Consider the straightforward matter of the number of troops that the United States deploys overseas. To listen to the debate today, one might imagine there were more American troops committed abroad than ever before. But that is not remotely the case. In 1953, the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas—325,000 in combat in Korea and more than 600,000 stationed in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. In 1968, it had over one million troops on foreign soil—537,000 in Vietnam and another half million stationed elsewhere. By contrast, in the summer of 2011, at the height of America’s deployments in its two wars, there were about 200,000 troops deployed in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, and another roughly 160,000 troops stationed in Europe and East Asia. Altogether, and including other forces stationed around the world, there were about 500,000 troops deployed overseas. This was lower even than the peacetime deployments of the Cold War. In 1957, for instance, there were over 750,000 troops deployed overseas. Only in the decade between the breakup of the Soviet empire and the attacks of September 11 was the number of deployed forces overseas lower than it is today. The comparison is even more striking if one takes into account the growth of the American population. When the United States had one million troops deployed overseas in 1953, the total American population was only 160 million. Today, when there are half a million troops deployed overseas, the American population is 313 million. The country is twice as large, with half as many troops deployed as fifty years ago. What about the financial expense? Many seem to believe that the cost of these deployments, and of the armed forces generally, is a major contributor to the soaring fiscal deficits that threaten the solvency of the national economy. But this is not the case, either. As the former budget czar Alice Rivlin has observed, the scary projections of future deficits are not “caused by rising defense spending,” much less by spending on foreign assistance. The runaway deficits projected for the coming years are mostly the result of ballooning entitlement spending. Even the most draconian cuts in the defense budget would produce annual savings of only $50 billion to $100 billion, a small fraction—between 4 and 8 percent—of the $1.5 trillion in annual deficits the United States is facing. In 2002, when Paul Kennedy was marveling at America’s ability to remain “the world’s single superpower on the cheap,” the United States was spending about 3.4 percent of GDP on defense. Today it is spending a little under 4 percent, and in years to come, that is likely to head lower again—still “cheap” by historical standards. The cost of remaining the world’s predominant power is not prohibitive. If we are serious about this exercise in accounting, moreover, the costs of maintaining this position cannot be measured without considering the costs of losing it. Some of the costs of reducing the American role in the world are, of course, unquantifiable. What is it worth to Americans to live in a world dominated by democracies rather than by autocracies? But some of the potential costs could be measured, if anyone cared to try. If the decline of American military power produced an unraveling of the international economic order that American power has helped sustain; if trade routes and waterways ceased to be as secure, because the U.S. Navy was no longer able to defend them; if regional wars broke out among great powers because they were no longer constrained by the American superpower; if American allies were attacked because the United States appeared unable to come to their defense; if the generally free and open nature of the international system became less so—if all this came to pass, there would be measurable costs. And it is not too far-fetched to imagine that these costs would be far greater than the savings gained by cutting the defense and foreign aid budgets by $100 billion a year. You can save money by buying a used car without a warranty and without certain safety features, but what happens when you get into an accident? American military strength reduces the risk of accidents by deterring conflict, and lowers the price of the accidents that occur by reducing the chance of losing. These savings need to be part of the calculation, too. As a simple matter of dollars and cents, it may be a lot cheaper to preserve the current level of American involvement in the world than to reduce it. Perhaps the greatest concern underlying the declinist mood at large in the country today is not really whether the United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of solving any of their most pressing economic and social problems. As many statesmen and commentators have asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete effectively in the twenty-first-century world? The only honest answer is, who knows? If American history is any guide, however, there is at least some reason to be hopeful. Americans have experienced this unease before, and many previous generations have also felt this sense of lost vigor and lost virtue: as long ago as 1788, Patrick Henry lamented the nation’s fall from past glory, “when the American spirit was in its youth.” There have been many times over the past two centuries when the political system was dysfunctional, hopelessly gridlocked, and seemingly unable to find solutions to crushing national problems—from slavery and then Reconstruction, to the dislocations of industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of social welfare during the Great Depression, to the confusions and paranoia of the early Cold War years. Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate, Vietnam, stagflation, and the energy crisis, cannot really believe that our present difficulties are unrivaled. Success in the past does not guarantee success in the future. But one thing does seem clear from the historical evidence: the American system, for all its often stultifying qualities, has also shown a greater capacity to adapt and recover from difficulties than many other nations, including its geopolitical competitors. This undoubtedly has something to do with the relative freedom of American society, which rewards innovators, often outside the existing power structure, for producing new ways of doing things; and with the relatively open political system of America, which allows movements to gain steam and to influence the behavior of the political establishment. The American system is slow and clunky in part because the Founders designed it that way, with a federal structure, checks and balances, and a written Constitution and Bill of Rights—but the system also possesses a remarkable ability to undertake changes just when the steam kettle looks about to blow its lid. There are occasional “critical elections” that allow transformations to occur, providing new political solutions to old and apparently insoluble problems. Of course, there are no guarantees: the political system could not resolve the problem of slavery without war. But on many big issues throughout their history, Americans have found a way of achieving and implementing a national consensus. When Paul Kennedy was marveling at the continuing success of the American superpower back in 2002, he noted that one of the main reasons had been the ability of Americans to overcome what had appeared to him in 1987 as an insoluble long-term economic crisis. American businessmen and politicians “reacted strongly to the debate about ‘decline’ by taking action: cutting costs, making companies leaner and meaner, investing in newer technologies, promoting a communications revolution, trimming government deficits, all of which helped to produce significant year-on-year advances in productivity.” It is possible to imagine that Americans may rise to this latest economic challenge as well. It is also reasonable to expect that other nations will, as in the past, run into difficulties of their own. None of the nations currently enjoying economic miracles is without problems. Brazil, India, Turkey, and Russia all have bumpy histories that suggest the route ahead will not be one of simple and smooth ascent. There is a real question whether the autocratic model of China, which can be so effective in making some strategic decisions about the economy in the short term, can over the long run be flexible enough to permit adaptation to a changing international economic, political, and strategic environment. In sum: it may be more than good fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to come through crises and emerge stronger and healthier than other nations while its various competitors have faltered. And it may be more than just wishful thinking to believe that it may do so again. But there is a danger. It is that in the meantime, while the nation continues to struggle, Americans may convince themselves that decline is indeed inevitable, or that the United States can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it gets its own house in order. To many Americans, accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from the moral and material burdens that have weighed on them since World War II. Many may unconsciously yearn to return to the way things were in 1900, when the United States was rich, powerful, and not responsible for world order. The underlying assumption of such a course is that the present world order will more or less persist without American power, or at least with much less of it; or that others can pick up the slack; or simply that the benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special exertion by anyone. Unfortunately, the present world order—with its widespread freedoms, its general prosperity, and its absence of great power conflict—is as fragile as it is unique. Preserving it has been a struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle in the decades to come. Preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment. In the end, the decision is in the hands of Americans. Decline, as Charles Krauthammer has observed, is a choice. It is not an inevitable fate—at least not yet. Empires and great powers rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter. Whether the United States begins to decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries will matter a great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in.

Economy is not resilient—we’re losing competitiveness and that causes global catastrophe

**Koba, 11** – \*Mark Koba is a Senior Editor at CNBC.com, “American Economic Decline? Exaggerated,” <http://www.cnbc.com/id/44271677/American_Economic_Decline_Exaggerated>)

With a **recent ratings downgrade, chronic unemployment, a growing budget deficit** and a political system that seems determined to self-destruct, it might appear that the U.S. is **losing its grip as the world's top economic power**. That's not to say that the U.S. shouldn't look over its shoulder. Many countries, specifically China, have long been gaining economic strength. "China has had high growth rates for over 30 years," says Frank Lavin, CEO of Export Now and a former U.S. ambassador to Singapore. "Their ability to sustain those rates combined with the softness in the U.S. economy gives rise to speculation that China will surpass the U.S and assume economic leadership on international issues." With China's GDP rate at around 8 percent to 11 percent a year, and the U.S. stuck at around 2 percent to 3 percent, it's easy to see why some say **China's economy will be larger than the U.S. economy by 2016**. China isn't the only growing economic force on the horizon, say experts. "The largest change over **the last 10 to 15 years has been the growth of emerging markets**," says Thomas Root, associate professor in finance at Drake University. "The BRIC countries capture the headlines, but many smaller countries, like some in South America and Asia, are having an increase in production." "The European Union and Germany in particular are the most **formidable threats** to the U.S.," Massey University's Haley adds. "They are big enough countries to be threats even as they struggle." America's battle to get its own economy growing at a faster pace opens the door for others, analysts point out. "Perhaps the most damning evidence [of potential American decline] is the **unemployment rate of around 9 percent**," explains Adrian Cronje, a partner and Chief Investment Officer at Balentine, a worldwide investment firm. "The question is whether large segments of the U.S. workforce are sufficiently skilled and productive to compete and drive future economic growth." There's also the **falling value of the dollar that could help knock the U.S. off its perch**, Cronje argues. "The U.S. dollar is in danger of **losing its status as a safe haven for investors**," Cronje says. "It's been in a long term bear market against hard assets like gold, and that decline reflects a decline in economic power." If the U.S. did lose its number one position, that would have **global implications**, according to Northeastern University's Dadkhah. "For the U.S., it would mean a lower standard of living and less power to influence international events," Dadkhah explains. "And America is the pole holding up the tent of international finance. It the pole falls, we'd have a period of uncertainty and **upheaval on a worldwide scale**." But what currently ails the U.S. is also hitting the rest of the world, according to analysts. Nations that for now seem to be riding a faster economic track will have likely have troubles of their own, says Roger Scher, professor of international political economy at Seton Hall University. "History has shown us that economic success stories turn sour," explains Scher. "Witness poorly growing Brazil and Peru, and Europe's bust in recent years. And watch out for China's potential property price bubble. It's huge and brings **considerable political risk**." As tempting as it may be to gloat over other countries' economic declines, analysts say the U.S. has plenty of work to do in order to remain a viable leader. "We need long-term plans to cut the deficit and reduce entitlement and defense spending," says Seton Hall University's Scher. "At the same time, we need to invest in education and infrastructure, and cut tax loopholes." In the end, say analysts, the U.S. should ultimately focus on its own economy and leave the question of who's number one to history. "It's always trendy to speak about the decline of the U.S.," says Sizemore Investment Letter's Sizemore. "I'm not sure it really matters that much. **Other countries are beating us with faster growth**, but they're starting at a lower base."

## Brazil

**Excess amounts of CO2 hurt plant growth, and will not allow us to avoid future food shortages**

**New York Times 11** – Article written by Justin Gills, writer for the New York Times and an environmental specialist (A Warming Planet Struggles to Feed Itself, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/science/earth/05harvest.html?\_r=2&pagewanted=1)

For decades, scientists believed that the human dependence on fossil fuels, for all the problems it was expected to cause, would offer one enormous benefit. Carbon dioxide, the main gas released by combustion, is also the primary fuel for the growth of plants. They draw it out of the air and, using the energy from sunlight, convert the carbon into energy-dense compounds like glucose. All human and animal life runs on these compounds. Humans have already raised the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by 40 percent since the Industrial Revolution, and are on course to double or triple it over the coming century. Studies have long suggested that the extra gas would supercharge the world’s food crops, and might be especially helpful in years when the weather is difficult. But many of those studies were done in artificial conditions, like greenhouses or special growth chambers. For the past decade, scientists at the University of Illinois have been putting the “CO2 fertilization effect” to a real-world test in the two most important crops grown in the United States. They started by planting soybeans in a field, then sprayed extra carbon dioxide from a giant tank. Based on the earlier research, they hoped the gas might bump yields as much as 30 percent under optimal growing conditions. But when they harvested their soybeans, they got a rude surprise: the bump was only half as large. “When we measured the yields, it was like, wait a minute — this is not what we expected,” said Elizabeth A. Ainsworth, a Department of Agriculture researcher who played a leading role in the work. When they grew the soybeans in the sort of conditions expected to prevail in a future climate, with high temperatures or low water, the extra carbon dioxide could not fully offset the yield decline caused by those factors. They also ran tests using corn, America’s single most valuable crop and the basis for its meat production and its biofuel industry. While that crop was already known to be less responsive to carbon dioxide, a yield bump was still expected — especially during droughts. The Illinois researchers got no bump. Their work has contributed to a broader body of research suggesting that extra carbon dioxide does act as plant fertilizer, but that the benefits are less than previously believed — and probably less than needed to avert food shortages. “One of the things that we’re starting to believe is that the positives of CO2 are unlikely to outweigh the negatives of the other factors,” said Andrew D. B. Leakey, another of the Illinois researchers.

**The Idsos are biased and are affiliated with Fuel Associations**

**UCS 5** – (The Union of Concerned Scientists report, Smoke, Mirrors & Hot Air: How ExxonMobil Uses Big Tobacco's Tactics to "Manufacture Uncertainty" on Climate Change,details how ExxonMobil has adopted the tobacco industry's disinformation tactics, as well as some of the same organizations and personnel, to cloud the scientific understanding of climate change and delay action on the issue. According to the report, ExxonMobil has funneled nearly $16 million between 1998 and 2005 to a network of 43 advocacy organizations that seek to confuse the public on global warming science,Global Warming Skeptic Organizations<http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/global_warming_contrarians/global-warming-skeptic.html>)

The Center claims to "disseminate factual reports and sound commentary on new developments in the world-wide scientific quest to determine the climactic and biological consequences of the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content." The Center is led by two brothers, Craig and Keith Idso. Their father, Sherwood Idso, is affiliated with the Greening Earth Society; the Center also shares a board member (Sylvan Wittwer) with GES. Both Idso brothers have been on the Western Fuels payroll at one time or another. **Spin**: Increased levels of CO2 will help plants, and that's good. **Funding:** The Center is extremely secretive of its funding sources, stating that it is their policy not to divulge it funders. There is evidence for a strong connection to the Greening Earth Society (ergo Western Fuels Association).

**Ice age won’t happen—already enough greenhouse gasses**

**IB Times, 12** – an international business news corporation, (“Next Ice Age in 1,500 years prevented by carbon dioxide emissions:, 9 January 2012, <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/279016/20120109/next-ice-age-years-carbon-emissions.htm>)

The next ice age, due in the next 1,500 years, won't arrive because of high levels of carbon dioxide greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, scientists reported Monday. Researchers already discovered evidence of at least five Ice Ages on Earth and around 3,500, the world will be due for another round of chilling and frozen wastelands. However, because of greenhouse gases that **already exist** in the atmosphere, another Ice Age likely won't happen. The research appeared in the Monday edition of the journal Nature Geoscience. "At current levels of CO2, even if emissions **stopped now** we'd probably have a **long interglacial duration** determined by whatever long-term processes could kick in and bring [atmospheric] CO2 down," Luke Skinner, lead author and professor at Cambridge University told BBC News. The study also included researchers from University College London, Bergen University in Norway and the University of Florida. The study concluded that for an Ice Age to occur, concentrations of carbon dioxide would have to fall to 240 parts per million - a 40 percent reduction of the 390 ppm in the current atmosphere.

**Continued warming shifts Atlantic currents resulting in ice age**

**Huey, 10** – writer for Greeniac, an environmental association concerned with the consequences of anthropogenic global warming, (Miranda, “Thermohaline Circulation – Why it matters for all of us” 15 June 2010, <http://www.greeniacs.com/GreeniacsArticles/Global-Warming/Thermohaline-Circulation.html>)

Thermohaline circulation isn’t a phrase you hear everyday. That is, not unless you’re an oceanographer. This fundamental ocean process supports three-fourths of marine life and shapes regional climates around the world.1 Climate change, often referred to as Global Warming, however, could slow or shut down entirely the essential ocean process, creating potentially disastrous consequences for life on earth. Most climatologists warn that global warming will most likely slow down the thermohaline circulation cycle by 10-50%% within the next 100 years.2 A warming climate could speed up the melting of Arctic glaciers, diluting the salty surface water with a large amount of freshwater. In addition, a changing northern climate could mean more rain and snow over the region, diluting the surface water even further. A warmer planet could also mean a warmer Arctic climate, which would warm the surface waters relative to the cooler seawater below. If the surface water never gets denser than the water below it, it may not sink below the cool and salty seawater below, preventing the current from ever entering the “global ocean conveyor belt.” So, first of all, what exactly is thermohaline circulation? It’s a cycle that drives of what is commonly known as the “ocean’s conveyor belt”—a 1,600 year long process in which all ocean water will flow—twisting and turning around the globe, rising and falling in sea depth, and eventually returning to the same spot to start the cycle over again.3 Put simply, this “conveyor belt” runs because cold water is denser than warm water and salt water is denser than fresh water. In warm, tropical climates, the sun will heat up the surface of the ocean, making the top layer of seawater less dense. In the Atlantic, the warm water then flows northward onto the colder, denser waters of cooler, northern regions. The water below it can then rise to the surface and get warmed as well, continuing the process. As the seawater travels north, it encounters more wind and evaporates some, getting saltier and cooler. Eventually, near the Arctic, the surface water gets so cold and salty that it sinks down to the ocean floor, where it flows all the way south to the Antarctic and then through equatorial areas the Indian Ocean or Pacific Ocean, where the seawater warms up again and rises to the surface, flowing back to the Atlantic to start the cycle over again.4 The consequences for both marine life and life on land could be drastic if thermohaline circulation slowed down. Thermohaline circulation which mixes ocean layers is key to providing nutrients to marine life on the ocean surface. For example, phytoplankton only live on the surface of the ocean’s waters because it largely subsists off the energy it receives from natural sunlight. Phytoplankton that die slowly sink to the ocean floor, decomposing and carrying nutrients that make it back up to the surface through thermohaline circulation. Without enough nutrients, phytoplankton growth could be limited, cutting off the bottom of the food chain for marine ecosystems.5 As bad as a slowing thermohaline circulation would be, it would not be nearly as disastrous as the ocean conveyor belt stopping completely and abruptly. Most scientists deem that worst-case scenario as a “low-probability, high-impact” event.6 Interestingly, BP CEO Tony Hayward said the same exact thing about the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.7 Although an abruptly stopped thermohaline circulation event was made famous in the movie The Day After Tomorrow, the Union of Concerned Scientists have made assurances that it will not be nearly as quick, widespread, or cause another Ice Age.8 Even under the fastest climate model, it would instead take a few decades and cause only regional cooling. Why would scientists think that thermohaline circulation stop abruptly? It already happened once, 8,200 years ago.9 According to evidence from ice cores, a century long cold spell during the Younger Dryas coincided with a flood of freshwater from melting glaciers, as well as the halting of the thermohaline circulation.10 Many scientists theorize that the rapid introduction of freshwater into ocean surfaces immediately stopped thermohaline circulation, inducing the massive global cooling of an average of 15 degrees.11 Some scientists predict that global warming will cause enough glacial melting to trigger another abrupt cold spell. Other scientists counter that the melting glaciers, cold spell, and halting thermohaline circulation were caused by separate factors or a broader natural cycle. Nevertheless, if an abrupt shut-down occurred, the consequences would be catastrophic. Thermohaline circulation is responsible for Europe’s warm temperatures relative to other countries at the same latitude. Warm surface waters from the south drift north towards Europe from equatorial regions, providing a moderate climate.12 Shutting it off could mean a regional ice age for northern latitudes. To a smaller degree, the same could go for the East Coast of the United States, since the warmer tropical current also flows northward along the coast.13 It could disrupt ecosystems, reducing agriculture, and increasing storms. A global warming trend could minimize or reverse some of these effects. Equatorial regions, on the other hand, could heat up and experience massive drought and famine.

**Tech enables adaptability**

**England, 11** Christopher England, “Will we survive the coming Ice Age?” <http://www.christopherengland.com/2011/06/will-we-survive-coming-ice-age.html> Accessed 6/25/12

So, as we are now faced with the need to change and adapt in order to survive the coming mini-Ice Age as temperatures continue to drop throughout Europe (and the North Americas), will we take the Inuit route or the Viking one? I think that with far more technology and understanding surrounding us than was available in the 1300s, we will be able to deal with it technically. But what about politically? The only real problem we have is the stranglehold on our industries that the left-wing global warming religion and lobby currently has. By putting their pointless carbon taxes onto everything they can, and funding silly green ideas instead (like wind-farms that aren't able to function to generate electricity when they are iced-up), they are not actually allowing us to start preparing for the coming era of long frozen winters and soggy summers, which will be with us for at least the next 70 years or so. Indeed, fuel prices are already rocketing and putting thousands into fuel poverty because of their carbon taxes. Will the long extended periods of freezing kill off the elderly and poor? It certainly killed thousands back in the previous mini-Ice Age that covered Britain. I suspect that because of our unpreparedness it will take the staking up of bodies in local mortuaries before Governments wake-up and react to the real needs of society to deal with climate change. Unfortunately, everything is skewed the wrong way because of the global warming religion. Generally speaking though, we will survive. We lived through periods of iced-over rivers and unworkable farmland before. This time we are far more technologically advanced, and assuming sea-ice doesn't cause too much disruption, we are far more geared towards importing goods from warmer climes, or genetically modifying food and growing it 'inside' rather than leaving it out in the snow and ice. It'll be fine; most of us will survive, so don't panic!

## Neolib

Extinction comes first

**Bok, 88** (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Rosenthal and Shehadi, Ed.)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical Imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences. Acknowledging such a rift would post a strong challenge to the unity and simplicity of Kant’s moral theory.

No root cause

**Larrivee, 10** – PF Economics at Mount St. Mary’s University – Masters from the Harvard Kennedy School and PhD in economics from Wisconsin, 2010 (John, A Framework for the Moral Analysis of Markets, 10/1, http://www.teacheconomicfreedom.org/files/larrivee-paper-1.pdf)

The Second Focal Point: Moral, Social, and Cultural Issues of Capitalism Logical errors abound in critical commentary on capitalism. Some critics observe a problem and conclude: “I see X in our society. We have a capitalist economy. Therefore capitalism causes X.” They draw their conclusion by looking at a phenomenon as it appears only in one system. Others merely follow a host of popular theories according to which capitalism is particularly bad. 6 The solution to such flawed reasoning is to be comprehensive, to look at the good and bad, in market and non-market systems. Thus the following section considers a number of issues—greed, selfishness and human relationships, honesty and truth, alienation and work satisfaction, moral decay, and religious participation—that have often been associated with capitalism, but have also been problematic in other systems and usually in more extreme form. I conclude with some evidence for the view that markets foster (at least some) virtues rather than undermining them. My purpose is not to smear communism or to make the simplistic argument that “capitalism isn’t so bad because other systems have problems too.” The critical point is that certain people thought various social ills resulted from capitalism, and on this basis they took action to establish alternative economic systems to solve the problems they had identified. That they failed to solve the problems, and in fact exacerbated them while also creating new problems, implies that capitalism itself wasn’t the cause of the problems in the first place, at least not to the degree theorized.

Innovation is the only sustainable path – solves the environment and decreases poverty

**Lomborg 11**

Bjorn Lomborg, directs the Copenhagen Consensus Center and is the author of The Skeptical Environmentalist and Cool It, Newsweek, June 12, 2011, "A Roadmap for the Planet", [http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/12/bjorn-lomborg-explains-how-to-save-the-planet.html#](http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/12/bjorn-lomborg-explains-how-to-save-the-planet.html)

Climate alarmists and campaigning environmentalists argue that the industrialized countries of the world have made sizable withdrawals on nature’s fixed allowance, and unless we change our ways, and soon, we are doomed to an abrupt end. Take the recent proclamation from the United Nations Environment Program, which argued that governments should dramatically cut back on the use of resources. The mantra has become commonplace: our current way of living is selfish and unsustainable. We are wrecking the world. We are gobbling up the last resources. We are cutting down the rainforest. We are polluting the water. We are polluting the air. We are killing plants and animals, destroying the ozone layer, burning the world through our addiction to fossil fuels, and leaving a devastated planet for future generations. In other words, humanity is doomed. It is a compelling story, no doubt. **It is also fundamentally wrong**, and the consequences are severe. Tragically, exaggerated environmental worries—and the willingness of so many to believe them—could ultimately prevent us from finding smarter ways to actually help our planet and ensure the health of the environment for future generations. Because, our fears notwithstanding, we actually get smarter. Although Westerners were once reliant on whale oil for lighting, we never actually ran out of whales. Why? High demand and rising prices for whale oil spurred a search for and investment in the 19th-century version of alternative energy. First, kerosene from petroleum replaced whale oil. We didn’t run out of kerosene, either: electricity supplanted it because it was a superior way to light our planet. For generations, we have consistently underestimated our capacity for innovation. There was a time when we worried that all of London would be covered with horse manure because of the increasing use of horse-drawn carriages. Thanks to the invention of the car, London has 7 million inhabitants today. Dung disaster averted. In fact, would-be catastrophes have regularly been pushed aside throughout human history, and so often because of innovation and technological development. We never just continue to do the same old thing. We innovate and avoid the anticipated problems. Think of the whales, and then think of the debate over cutting emissions today. Instead of singlemindedly trying to force people to do without carbon-emitting fuels, we must recognize that we won’t make any real progress in cutting CO2 emissions until we can create affordable, efficient alternatives. We are far from that point today: much-hyped technologies such as wind and solar energy remain very expensive and inefficient compared with cheap fossil fuels. Globally, wind provides just 0.3 percent of our energy, and solar a minuscule 0.1 percent. Current technology is so inefficient that, to take just one example, if we were serious about wind power, we would have to blanket most countries with wind turbines to generate enough energy for everybody, and we would still have the massive problem of storage. We don’t know what to do when the wind doesn’t blow. Making the necessary breakthroughs will require mass improvements across many technologies. The sustainable response to global warming, then, is one that sees us get much more serious about investment into alternative-energy research and development. This has a much greater likelihood of leaving future generations at least the same opportunities as we have today. Because what, exactly, is sustainability? Fourteen years ago, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development report “Our Common Future,” chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, provided the most-quoted definition. Sustainable development “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The measure of success, then, is whether or not we give future generations the same opportunities that we have had. This prompts the question: have we lived unsustainably in the past? In fact, by almost any measure, humans have left a legacy of increased opportunity for their descendants. And this is true not just for the rich world but also for developing countries. In the last couple of hundred years we have become much richer than in all previous history. Available production per capita—the amount that an average individual can consume—increased eightfold between 1800 and 2000. In the past six decades, poverty has fallen more than in the previous 500 years. This decade alone, China will by itself lift 200 million individuals out of poverty. While one in every two people in the developing world was poor just 25 years ago, today it is one in four. Although much remains to be done, developing countries have become much more affluent, with a fivefold increase in real per capita income between 1950 and today. But it’s not just about money. The world has generally become a much better educated place, too. Illiteracy in the developing world has fallen from about 75 percent for the people born in the early part of the 1900s to about 12 percent among the young of today. More and more people have gained access to clean water and sanitation, improving health and income. And according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the percentage of undernourished people in the developing world has dropped from more than 50 percent in 1950 to 16 percent today. As humans have become richer and more educated, we have been able to enjoy more leisure time. In most developed countries, where there are available data, yearly working hours have fallen drastically since the end of the 19th century: today we work only about half as much as we did then. Over the last 30 years or so, total free time for men and women has increased, thanks to reductions in workload and housework. Globally, life expectancy today is 69. Compare this with an average life span of 52 in 1960, or of about 30 in 1900. Advances in public health and technological innovation have dramatically lengthened our lives. We have consistently achieved these remarkable developments by focusing on technological innovation and investment designed to create a richer future. And while major challenges remain, the future appears to hold great promise, too. The U.N. estimates that over this century, the planet’s human inhabitants will become 14 times richer and the average person in the developing world a whopping 24 times richer. By the end of the century, the U.N. estimates we will live to be 85 on average, and virtually everyone will read, write, and have access to food, water, and sanitation. That’s not too shabby. Rather than celebrating this amazing progress, many find it distasteful. Instead of acknowledging and learning from it, we bathe ourselves in guilt, fretting about our supposed unsustainable lives. Certainly many argue that while the past may have improved, surely it doesn’t matter for the future, because we are destroying the environment! But not so fast. In recent decades, air quality in wealthy countries has vastly improved. In virtually every developed country, the air is more breathable and the water is more drinkable than they were in 1970. London, renowned for centuries for its infamous smog and severe pollution, today has the cleanest air that it has had since the Middle Ages. Today, some of the most polluted places in the world are the megacities of the developing world, such as Beijing, New Delhi, and Mexico City. But remember what happened in developed countries. Over a period of several hundred years, increasing incomes were matched by increasing pollution. In the 1930s and 1940s, London was more polluted than Beijing, New Delhi, or Mexico City are today. Eventually, with increased affluence, developed countries gradually were better able to afford a cleaner environment. That is happening already today in some of the richest developing countries: air-pollution levels in Mexico City have been dropping precisely because of better technology and more wealth. Though air pollution is by far the most menacing for humans, water quality has similarly been getting better. Forests, too, are regrowing in rich countries, though still being lost in poor places where slash-and-burn is preferable to starvation.

Violence decreasing in the status quo – Neo-lib decreases incentive for war

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When quite **a number of scholars** **simultaneously and independently** of one another arrive at very similar conclusions on an **issue of cardinal theoretical and practical significance**, their thesis deserves, and has received, great attention. The thesis is that **war and violence** in general have progressively **decreased in recent times, during the modern era, and** even throughout history. Of course, despite their unanimity, all these scholars could still be wrong. Indeed, each of them tells a similar story of people’s disbelief at their findings, most notably that **we live in the most peaceful period in** human **history**. Some of them even explain the general incredulity by the findings of evolutionary psychology according to which we tend to be overly optimistic about ourselves but overly pessimistic about the world at large. Having myself written about the marked decrease in deadly human violence (Gat, 2006), I agree with the authors’ general thesis. However, their unanimity falters over, and they are less clear about, the historical trajectory of and the reasons for the decline in violence and war, questions that are as important as the general thesis itself. Previous Section Next Section Hobbes was right, and Rousseau wrong, about the state of nature Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) towers above all the other books surveyed here in size, scope, boldness, and scholarly excellence. It has deservedly attracted great public attention and has become a best-seller. Massively documented, this 800-page volume is lavishly furnished with statistics, charts, and diagrams, which are one of the book’s most effective features. The book, spanning the whole human past as far back as our aboriginal condition, points to two major steps in the decline of violence. The first is the sharp decline in violent mortality which resulted from the rise of the state-Leviathan from around 5,000 years ago. This conclusion is based on the most comprehensive studies of the subject published over the past 15 years (Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc, 2003; Gat, 2006), which demonstrate on the basis of anthropological and archaeological evidence that Hobbes’s picture of the anarchic state of nature as a very violent one was fundamentally true. Pinker rightly summarizes that violent mortality with the rise of states dropped from a staggering estimated 15% of the population, 25% of the men, in pre-state societies, to about 1–5%. The main reason for this drop is the enforcement of internal peace by the Leviathan, but also, less noted by Pinker, lower mobilization rates and a smaller exposure of the civilian population to war than with tribal groups, as will be explained shortly. This conclusion regarding the dramatic drop in violent mortality with the transition to the state is at odds with the claim made by Jack Levy & William Thompson in their book, The Arc of War (2011). As the book’s title implies, Levy & Thompson posit a great increase in warfare during history, before a decrease during the past two centuries. Thus, the book claims that mortality in fighting greatly increased, ‘accelerated’ in the authors’ language, with the transition to the state. They reach this conclusion by making several mistaken assumptions. First, although professing ignorance about the distant past because of the lack of evidence on the behavior of hunter-gatherer societies before the adoption of agriculture some 10,000 years ago, they cite and are heavily influenced by the old Rousseauite anthropology of the generation after the 1960s, which recent studies have refuted. Obviously, one does not have to accept the above findings regarding the pervasiveness and great lethality of prehistoric warfare. But Levy & Thompson simply do not engage with them. They accept as true the Rousseauite premise that sparse human population could not possibly have had that much to fight about. However, recently extant hunter-gatherer societies prove the opposite. Australia is our best laboratory of hunter-gatherer societies, because that vast continent was entirely populated by them and ‘unpolluted’ by agriculturalists, pastoralists or states until the arrival of the Europeans in 1788. And the evidence shows that the Australian tribes fought incessantly with one another. Even in the Central Australian Desert, whose population density was as low as one person per 35 square miles, among the lowest there is, conflict and deadly fighting were the rule. Much of that fighting centered on the water-holes vital for survival in this area, with the violent death rate there reckoned to have been several times higher than in any state society. In most other places, hunting territories were monopolized and fiercely defended by hunter-gatherers because they were quickly depleted. Even among the Inuit of Arctic Canada, who were so sparse as to experience no resource competition, fighting to kidnap women was pervasive, resulting in a violent death rate 10 times higher than the USA’s peak rate of 1990, itself the highest in the developed world. In more hospitable and densely populated environments casualties averaged, as already mentioned, 15% of the population and 25% of the men, and the surviving men were covered with scars (Gat, 2006: chs 2, 6). We are not dealing here with a piece of exotic curiosity. Ninety-five percent of the history of our species Homo sapiens sapiens – people who are like us – was spent as hunter-gatherers. The transition to agriculture and the state is very recent, the tip of the iceberg, in human history. Furthermore, the human state of nature turns out to be no different than the state of nature in general. Here too, science has made a complete turnabout. During the 1960s people believed that animals did not kill each other within the same species, which made humans appear like a murderous exception and fed speculations that warfare emerged only with civilization. Since then, however, it has been found that animals kill each other extensively within species, a point pressed on every viewer of television nature documentaries. There is nothing special about humans in this regard. Thus, lethal human fighting did not ‘emerge’ at some point in history, as Levy & Thompson posit. Previous Section Next Section Violent death sharply decreased with the rise of the Leviathan As mentioned earlier and as Pinker well realizes, violent mortality actually dropped steeply with the emergence of the state-Leviathan. Here is where Levy & Thompson make a second mistake. For measuring the lethality of warfare they use evidence of battle mortality, but this is highly misleading for various reasons. First, pre-state tribes’ main fighting modes were not the battle but the raid and the ambush – capturing the enemy by surprise and often annihilating entire sleeping camps: men, women, and children. Second, the size of battles merely indicates the size of the states and their armies, which are obviously larger than tribal groups in absolute terms. Yet the main question is relative casualties, what percentage of the population died violently. And here the fact is that while states and their armies grew by a factor of tens, hundreds, and thousands, giving a spectacular impression of large-scale fighting, relative casualties actually decreased under the state, and not only because of internal peace. Indeed, casualties decreased precisely because states grew large. Take Egypt, for example, part of the ‘acceleration’ of war with the emergence of states in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and China, according to Levy & Thompson. The size of the Egyptian army with which Pharaoh Ramses II fought the Hittite empire at the Battle of Kadesh (commonly dated 1274 BCE) was 20,000–25,000 soldiers. This was a very large army by the standards of the time. Yet the total population of Egypt was about 2–3 million, so the army constituted 1% of the population at most. This was very much the standard in large states and empires throughout history because of the great financial and logistical problems of maintaining large armies for long periods at great distances from home. Thus, in comparison to the high military participation rates of small-scale tribal societies, participation rates, and hence war casualties, in large states’ armies were much lower. Moreover, in contrast to the great vulnerability of women and children in small-scale tribal warfare, the civilian population of Egypt was sheltered by distance from the theaters of military operations and not often exposed to the horrors of war. Such relative security, interrupted only by large-scale invasions, is one of the main reasons why societies experienced great demographic growth after the emergence of the state. It is also the reason why civil war, when the war rages within the country, tends to be the most lethal form of war, as Hobbes very well realized. Warfare and feuds in the pre- and early-modern eras Levy & Thompson further posit that between the 14th and early 19th centuries, Europe was the scene of a second ‘acceleration’ in the historical trajectory of violence. This is very much in line with the prevailing perceptions regarding early modern European history, but these perceptions are most probably wrong, and for the same reason as before: Levy & Thompson count absolute battle casualties, and obviously states became more centralized during this period and armies grew in number, so battles also grew in size. Yet it was the anarchy and feudal fragmentation in Europe between the fall of the Roman Empire and 1200 that were responsible for the pervasive insecurity and endemic violence that characterized the Dark Ages and resulted in, among other things, a sharp demographic decline. Again, small-scale usually meant more, not less, violent mortality. The focus on early modern Europe is misleading also in another way: in the late Middle Ages the Mongol conquests inflicted on the societies of China, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe casualties and destruction that were among the highest ever suffered during historical times. Estimates of the sharp decline experienced by the populations of China and Russia, for example, vary widely. Still, even by the lowest estimates they were at least as great, and in China almost definitely much greater, than the Soviet Union’s horrific rate in World War II of about 15%. The receding of medieval anarchy in the face of the growing European state-Leviathans was the first step towards a steep decline in the continent’s violent mortality rate beginning in early modernity and continuing to the present day. The studies and data cited by Pinker with respect to the domestic aspect of this trend are strikingly paralleled by those of Robert Muchembled’s History of Violence (2012). The work of a historian, the book meticulously documents, on the basis of French legal records, a 20-fold decrease in homicide rates between the 13th and 20th centuries. Earlier studies of other parts of Europe, starting with Gurr (1981), have come up with similar findings. Like Pinker, Muchembled attributes the steep decline to the state’s growing authority, as its justice system effectively replaced and deterred ‘private justice’, vendetta, and pervasive violence, all of them endemic in unruly societies. Correspondingly, again like Pinker, Muchembled invokes Norbert Elias’s (2000) ‘civilizing process’, whereby the defense of honor by sword and knife, a social norm and imperative in most traditional societies, is gradually given up among both the nobility and the general populace. The civilizing process is partly a function of the growing authority of the state’s rule and justice system. But there were other factors involved, which Pinker excels in identifying and weaving together. Although he is not a historian, his historical synthesis is exemplarily rich and nuanced. He specifies the growing humanitarian sensibilities in Europe of the Enlightenment, which he traces to, among other things, the gradual improvement in living conditions, growing commercial spirit and, above all, the print revolution with the attendant values and habits of reasoning, introspection, and empathy that it inculcated among the reading elites. As Pinker points out, not only did homicide rates decline but also other previously common forms of violence, such as judicial disembowelment and torture, were becoming unacceptable by the 18th century. This was the beginning of a continuous process which during the following centuries would bring about, among other things, the abolition of slavery and the decline of capital punishment, tyranny, and political violence in the developed world – most notably in the areas where the values of Enlightenment humanitarianism triumphed. Both Pinker and Muchembled identify a change in the trend towards increased violence and homicide rates in the United States and Europe from the 1960s on. They attribute this change (Pinker is particularly elaborative here) to the erosion of public authority and some reversal of the ‘civilizing process’ with the cults of youth culture, defiance of authority, radical ideologies of violence by the ‘oppressed’, and the fragmentation of the stable family structure. Pinker identifies a return to a downward trend in violence from about 1990 on, which he attributes to an ebbing of much of the above through reasserted state action and changes in the public mood. A last point worth mentioning in this context: Muchembled reveals that throughout the steep decline in homicide rates, from medieval times to the present, 90% or more of all cases have been perpetrated by men, especially between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. As Daly & Wilson (1988: 145–149) have shown, this ratio is found in each and every society studied around the globe, from hunter-gatherers to agricultural and industrial societies, irrespective of the vastly different homicide rates among them. Previous Section Next Section The decline of war and the three `Long Peaces' after 1815 We now move to the decline of war, which is our main concern here. Most people are surprised to learn that the occurrence of war and overall mortality in war sharply decreased after 1815, most notably in the developed world. The ‘Long Peace’ among the great powers after 1945 is more recognized and is widely attributed to the nuclear factor, a decisive factor to be sure, which concentrated the minds of all the protagonists wonderfully. The (inter-)democratic peace has been equally recognized. But in actuality, the decrease in war had been very marked before the nuclear era and encompassed both democracies and non-democracies. In the century after 1815, wars among economically advanced countries declined in their frequency to about one-third of what they had been in the previous centuries, an unprecedented change. Indeed, the Long Peace after 1945 was preceded by the second longest peace among the great powers, between 1871 and 1914, and by the third longest peace, between 1815 and 1854 (Gat, 2006: 536–537, 608). Thus, the three longest periods of peace by far in the modern great powers system all occurred after 1815. Clearly, one needs to explain the entire trend, while also accounting for the glaring divergence from it: the two World Wars. Previous Section Next Section Is modern war more lethal and destructive than before? In his earlier works, Levy (1983) was among the first to document the much-reduced frequency of war after 1815. But what brought about this change? Levy & Thompson assume – this is perhaps the most natural hypothesis – that wars declined in frequency because they became too lethal, destructive, and expensive. Supposedly, a trade-off of sorts was created between the intensity and frequency of warfare: fewer, larger wars supplanting many smaller ones. This hypothesis barely holds, however, because, again, relative to population and wealth wars have not become more lethal and costly than earlier in history. Furthermore, as Levy & Thompson rightly document, the wars of the 19th century – the most peaceful century in European history – were particularly light, in comparative terms, so there is no trade-off here. True, the World Wars, especially World War II, were certainly on the upper scale of the range in terms of casualties. Yet, as already noted, they were far from being exceptional in history. Once more, we need to look at relative casualties, general human mortality in any number of wars that happen to rage around the world, rather than at the aggregate created by the fact that many states participated in the World Wars. I have already mentioned the Mongol invasions, but other examples abound. In the first three years of the Second Punic War, 218–16 BCE, Rome lost some 50,000 citizens of the ages of 17–46, out of a total of about 200,000 in that age demographic (Brunt, 1971). This was roughly 25% of the military-age cohorts in only three years, the same range as the Russian and higher than the German rates in World War II. This, and the devastation of Rome’s free peasantry during the Second Punic War, did not reduce Rome’s propensity for war thereafter. During the Thirty Years War (1618–48) population loss in Germany is estimated at between one-fifth and one-third – either way higher than the German casualties in World War I and World War II combined. People often assume that more developed military technology during modernity means greater lethality and destruction, but in fact it also means greater protective power, as with mechanized armor, mechanized speed and agility, and defensive electronic measures. Offensive and defensive advances generally rise in tandem. In addition, it is all too often forgotten that the vast majority of the many millions of non-combatants killed by Germany during World War II – Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, Soviet civilians – fell victim to intentional starvation, exposure to the elements, and mass executions rather than to any sophisticated military technology. Instances of genocide in general during the 20th century, much as earlier in history, were carried out with the simplest of technologies, as the Rwanda genocide horrifically reminded us. Nor have wars during the past two centuries been economically more costly than they were earlier in history, again relative to overall wealth. War has always involved massive economic exertion and has been the single most expensive item of state spending (e.g. massively documented, Bonney, 1999). Examples are countless, and it will suffice to mention that both 16th- and 17th-century Spain and 18th-century France were economically ruined by war and staggering war debts, which in the French case brought about the Revolution. Furthermore, death by starvation in premodern wars was widespread. Previous Section Next Section Is it peace that has become more profitable? So if wars have not become more costly and destructive during the past two centuries then why have they receded, particularly in the developed world? The answer is the advent of the industrial–commercial revolution after 1815, the most profound transformation of human society since the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. The correlation between the decline of war in the developed world and the process of modernization, both unfolding since 1815, is surely not accidental, and the causation is not difficult to locate. In the first place, given explosive growth in per capita wealth, about 30- to 50-fold thus far, the Malthusian trap has been broken. Wealth no longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively shifted away from a zero-sum game. Secondly, economies are no longer overwhelmingly autarkic, instead having become increasingly interconnected by specialization, scale, and exchange. Consequently, foreign devastation potentially depressed the entire system and was thus detrimental to a state’s own wellbeing. This reality, already noted by Mill (1848/1961: 582), starkly manifested itself after World War I, as Keynes (1920) had anticipated in his criticism of the reparations imposed on Germany. Thirdly, greater economic openness has decreased the likelihood of war by disassociating economic access from the confines of political borders and sovereignty. It is no longer necessary to politically possess a territory in order benefit from it. Of the above three factors, the second one – commercial interdependence – has attracted most of the attention in the literature. But the other two factors have been no less significant. Thus, the greater the yield of competitive economic cooperation, the more counterproductive and less attractive conflict becomes. Rather than war becoming more costly, as is widely believed, it is in fact peace that has been growing more profitable. Referring to my argument in this regard, Levy & Thompson (2011: 72–75) excused themselves from deciding on the issue on the grounds of insufficient information regarding the cost of premodern war. But as already noted, the information on the subject is quite clear.

Neoliberalism key to space colonization

**Shakouri, 13** has an LL.M. in international law and is based in Tehran (Babak Shakouri “Space settlements on the Moon and elsewhere will create new legal issues” 4/1/13 http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2269/1) //NG

**Once human settlements on nearby celestial bodies are established, their commercial exchanges with Earth will become an issue**. Space migrants who choose to leave Earth and settle in an uncomfortable concrete or metal base on the Moon or Mars must have very strong incentives to step forth for such breathtaking adventure**. There seems to be no greater reward than the lucrative economic opportunities found in a settlement on an alien surface full of potential resources.**¶ The positive **economic exchange rate with the Earth may assure the continuation and even expansion of space settlements on celestial bodies. Otherwise, settlers either will depend on equipment and reinforcements from Earth or go bankrupt. This may shed light on the importance of adopting** suitable **legal regime for human space settlements that,** on one hand, fuels **the needed investments for establishment of space settlements and,** on the other hand, **helps the efforts of inhabitants those settlements flourish economically and leads ultimately to their self-sufficiency.**¶ **There is sufficient evidence** to suggest **that the legal framework of a free market economic system incredibly suits the requirements of human settlements in space, since freedom of business and market innovation, together with recognition of private property, are the key elements in making** the **humans** the first known **spacefaring** intelligent species.¶ Finally, the matter of the administrative legal regime of space settlements is another noteworthy issue to be considered. This matter, which is mainly categorized within the realm of administrative law, has attracted less attention in comparison with other legal aspects of outer space activities, but in no way should its importance and impact on future space settlement be disregarded.

Extinction – we have to go to space

**Garan, 10** – Astronaut (Ron, 3/30/10, Speech published in an article by Nancy Atkinson, “The Importance of Returning to the Moon,” http://www.universetoday.com/61256/astronaut-explains-why-we-should-return-to-the-moon/)

Resources and Other Benefits: **Since we live in a world of finite resources and the global population continues to grow, at some point the human race must utilize resources from space in order to survive. We are already constrained by our limited resources, and the decisions we make today will have a profound affect on the future of humanity. Using resources and energy from space will enable continued growth and the spread of prosperity to the developing world without destroying our planet.** Our minimal investment in space exploration (less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget) reaps tremendous intangible benefits in almost every aspect of society, from technology development to high-tech jobs. **When we reach the point of sustainable space operations we will be able to transform the world from a place where nations quarrel over scarce resources to one where the basic needs of all people are met and we unite in the common adventure of exploration.** The first step is a sustainable permanent human lunar settlement.

Even if neoliberalism is bad, the alternative presents a worse form of that system

**Rogoff 11** (Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Harvard Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-modern-capitalism-sustainable#Hwu4FWu8l6ucEpdb.99 12-2-11)

**I am often asked if the** recent global **financial crisis marks the** beginning of the **end of modern capitalism. It is a curious question,** because **it seems to presume** that there is **a viable replacement waiting in the wings**. The truth of the matter is that, for now at least**, the only serious alternatives to today’s dominant Anglo-American paradigm are other forms of capitalism.** Illustration by Paul Lachine CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphContinental European capitalism, which combines generous health and social benefits with reasonable working hours, long vacation periods, early retirement, and relatively equal income distributions, would seem to have everything to recommend it – except sustainability**. China’s Darwinian capitalism**, with its fierce competition among export firms, **a weak social-safety net, and widespread government intervention, is widely touted as the inevitable heir to Western capitalism, if only because of China’s huge size and consistent outsize growth rate.** Yet China’s economic system is continually evolving. CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIndeed, it is far from clear how far China’s political, economic, and financial structures will continue to transform themselves, and whether China will eventually morph into capitalism’s new exemplar. In any case, **China is still encumbered by the usual social, economic, and financial vulnerabilities of a rapidly growing lower-income country**. CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphPerhaps the real point is that, **in the broad sweep of history, all current forms of capitalism are ultimately transitional. Modern-day capitalism has had an extraordinary run** since the start of the Industrial Revolution two centuries ago, lifting billions of ordinary people out of abject poverty**. Marxism and heavy-handed socialism have disastrous records by comparison**. But, as industrialization and technological progress spread to Asia (and now to Africa), someday the struggle for subsistence will no longer be a primary imperative, and contemporary capitalism’s numerous flaws may loom larger.

Latin America proves anti-neoliberal movements need specific political proposals – the alt alone is doomed to failure

**Sader, 8** – PhD Poli Sci Univ of Sau Paolo (Emir, THE WEAKEST LINK? Neoliberalism in Latin America New Left Review 52, July-August 2008 <http://newleftreview.org/II/52/emir-sader-the-weakest-link-neoliberalism-in-latin-america>)

The **entire framework of political and ideological struggle in Latin America** has thus been remodelled under neoliberal hegemony. The radical reversal of the balance of power imposed by the dictatorships of the preceding decades was further reinforced by the new world order. The abandonment of popular forces by former nationalist or social-democratic allies, together with the harsh social consequences of free-market economics, have propelled social movements into the forefront of the resistance to neoliberalism—the third and latest strategy from below. The Zapatistas, the landless peasant movement (MST) in Brazil, the indigenist movements of Bolivia and Ecuador, the piqueteros or unemployed workers’ activists in Argentina—these are just some of the groups that have pioneered the new militancy. They have resisted to the best of their ability while neoliberalism stripped the state of its functions, pushed through the wholesale privatization of public enterprises and expropriated rights to formal employment, health and education. Opposition to NAFTA was the central plank of the Zapatista platform unveiled in 1994. Landless peasants in Brazil have taken action against sell-offs, and the resistance to water privatization in Cochabamba in 2000 was the starting point for a remarkable new phase in the history of the Bolivian left. Something similar took place in Ecuador, where indigenist movements demonstrated their power of veto against two neoliberal administrations—under Abdalá Bucaram in 1997 and Jamil Mahuad in 2001—forcing both presidents from office. Later mobilizations, this time led by urban movements formed to defend citizens’ rights, overthrew a third government, that of Lucio Gutiérrez, in 2005. The difficulties experienced by the neoliberal model itself in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, combined with the pressure of popular resistance to it, opened the door to a new phase, in which the left camp formulated urgent alternatives in the context of the crisis of hegemony across the continent. This posed dilemmas to which some movements responded positively, whereas others held back. A common position among the latter was to use their critiques of the traditional left, the neoliberal state and standard political practices to justify a sweeping repudiation of parties, state and politics in general, taking refuge in what they called ‘the autonomy of social movements’. At a time when neoliberalism was sharpening its assault on the state, in favour of the market; on politics, in favour of economics; and on political parties, in favour of corporations, a certain ambiguity crept into the distinction between movements that championed the ‘social’ dimension to the detriment of politics, parties and states, and those same neoliberal arguments. A new tendency arose within the left or the overall **resistance to neoliberalism, embodied in social movements and NGOs, and articulated around the dichotomy of ‘state versus civil society’**. The World Social Forum reinforced this tendency by welcoming social movements and NGOs but remaining closed to political parties, arguing that this space belonged to civil society. There are two main problems with this position. Firstly, it blurs the boundaries with neoliberal discourse, since as we pointed out above, the latter likewise regards the state and party politics as its great enemies. Secondly, given that neoliberalism is characterized by the wholesale expropriation of rights, **it can only be overcome in the political sphere**: through the universalization of rights enacted by the governing authority of the state. **Otherwise, the struggle against neoliberalism would remain perpetually on the defensive, having discarded the political instruments necessary for its own realization**. **Some movements have remained trapped in this paradox, ostensibly embodying hubs of resistance yet unable to move forward into challenging neoliberal hegemony, via a fresh articulation of the social with the political. Their critique of the state is subordinated to the terms of the theoretical discourse of neoliberalism, structured around the polarization of state versus private.** This polarity is designed to demonize the state, take control of the private sphere (in which market relations are embedded) and abolish the indispensable framework for the democratization and defeat of neoliberalism: the public sphere. The real polarization is between the public sphere and the market sphere, in that the neoliberal project is committed to the infinite extension of market relations, whereas the state is not so much a pole as a space of hegemonic dispute between the two spheres. The construction of an anti-neoliberal alternative must begin with the reorganization or recasting of the state in favour of the public sphere, universalizing citizens’ rights while divorcing the state and general social relationships from the market. To democratize means to de-marketize, to recuperate for the terrain of people’s rights that which neoliberalism has delivered into the hands of the market. Limiting the field of action to the ‘social’ as opposed to the ‘political’, proclaiming the autonomy of social movements as a principle, means condemning oneself to impotence, and ultimately to defeat. The cases of Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina provide instructive examples of these alternatives. In Bolivia, the new left was constructed upon a critique of the blind economism of the traditional left, which classified indigenous peoples solely as campesinos—peasants—because their means of subsistence could be defined as small-scale rural production. This economism had robbed the Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní peoples of their deep and ancient identity. The new critique—explicitly voiced by Alvaro García Linera, current vice-president of Bolivia—empowered the construction of a new political subject: the indigenous movement. In alliance with other social forces, the movement went on to found the MAS—Movimiento al Socialismo—in order to unite the forces built up since 2000 towards effective action in the political sphere and hegemony at the national level, through the candidacy and presidency of Evo Morales. Since 2000 and leading up to Evo’s election six years later, the militant activism of indigenous movements succeeded in preventing the privatization of the water supply that was to be exploited by a French company, and overthrew the neoliberal governments of Sánchez de Lozada and of his vice-president Carlos Mesa. Morales was elected on a platform that pledged to nationalize natural resources, undertake agrarian reform and convene a Constituent Assembly, charged with redefining Bolivia as a multinational, multi-ethnic, multicultural state. The indigenous movement progressed from specific issues—such as water—through a struggle against the national government, to the creation of a party rooted in social movements, and finally to the construction of an alternative anti-neoliberal project for Bolivia to be implemented by a state re-founded on new lines. Similar events took place in Ecuador, where the resistance to neoliberalism spearheaded by indigenous movements brought down two governments. Movements such as Pachakutik and CONAIE now placed their trust in a military man, Lucio Gutiérrez, who had played a role in the fall of the second government and participated in the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre; there were to be several indigenous representatives in his cabinet. But even before taking office, Gutiérrez travelled to Washington to sign agreements with the Bush Administration, betraying his campaign pledges on economic policy and the military base at Manta, where US troops were stationed. The indigenous movements withdrew their support and pulled out of the government, but they were divided. Some leaders remained loyal to Gutiérrez until the end, and the indigenous forces were so weakened by the process that they played little part in the 2005 uprisings that led to his fall, which was the work mostly of urban movements. During the 2006 presidential election, the left was represented by Rafael Correa, a young Christian economist who had briefly served in the government of Gutiérrez’s vice-president and campaigned on an anti-neoliberal platform which presented itself as the political continuation of all the grass-roots mobilizations of recent years. At first the indigenous movements did not stir, mistrustful of institutional participation after their experiences in the Constituent Assembly and Gutiérrez’s government. When they finally fielded a candidate in the shape of their leader, Luis Macas, the space of the left was already occupied by Correa and his largely urban followers, although Correa also attracted the support of the indigenous population. The movement in Ecuador proved unable to transcend the dilemma between the ‘autonomy of the social’ and the need to reconnect with the political sphere, remaining split between three options: the traditional form of supporting and participating in governments; withdrawal from the institutional political fray; and the belated fielding of an assertive but isolated candidate who took only 2 per cent of the vote. And so a movement with an extraordinary history failed to progress from the path of pure resistance to that of the construction of alternatives, and found itself excluded when the time came to plan for post-neoliberalism. In Bolivia, by contrast, indigenous movements did prove equal to making this transition. The foundation of MAS and the candidacy of its leader, Evo Morales, expressed a new way of linking social movements to the political sphere. Evo continued as president of the Coca Growers’ Federation of Cochabamba, his native province, at the same time as he became the leading candidate of the Bolivian left and won election as President of the Republic. This achievement is a milestone in the history of the Latin American left, and more specifically in the history of anti- and post-neoliberal struggles. The piqueteros of Argentina also illustrate the dilemma facing the new movements. These groups sprang to prominence during the terminal crisis of peso–dollar parity—an extreme and radical example of financial neoliberalism—by organizing mass demonstrations and road blocks, attracting many who had been pauperized by the effects of the currency peg. There was also a proliferation of factory takeovers, in which workers successfully rescued concerns that had been abandoned or closed by their proprietors. This early conflict with the De la Rúa government—which had inherited the dollar-parity policy from the Menem administration, and stuck with it until it blew up in their faces—marked the beginning of the deepest crisis ever faced by the Argentine state. In December 2001, after angry demonstrations against his government, De la Rúa fled from the Casa Rosada in a helicopter. Over the following days, several more presidents came and went. The bankruptcy of the economic model was obvious, and the possibility of a non-neoliberal government openly discussed. When new elections were called, Carlos Menem came up with an even more radical proposal: full dollarization of the Argentine economy. This would imply severing the country from processes of regional integration, which might not have recovered from the blow, and would also be damaged by Menem’s plan to boost US free-trade ambitions by signing a bilateral treaty between the two countries. Faced with this crisis of hegemony for the traditional political parties—the Partido Radical in disarray after De la Rúa’s resignation, the Peronists bitterly divided—the social movements coined the famous slogan, ¡Que se vayan todos!: Out with the lot of them! This amounted to a refusal to take part in the electoral process, yet without suggesting any way in which power might be rethought or reorganized. It was a quintessential expression of the ‘autonomy of social movements’, disdainful of politics but lacking any alternatives. From a position of strength, one can indeed get rid of ‘the lot of them’. Without organized political forces, the slogan is **merely a way to bow out from the fight for an alternative hegemony.** In the Argentine case, this enabled Menem to win the first electoral round in 2002 and a relatively obscure provincial governor, Néstor Kirchner, to win the second. Kirchner set out to project, from within Peronism, the image of a moderate alternative to Menem in the mould of Lula or Tabaré Vázquez. Thus the crisis of hegemony was overcome. Kirchner capitalized on the fury of the streets, and the contempt for the Menem and De la Rúa governments. From a centre-left position, he set about repairing the cracks in state legitimacy and winning over many sectors of the piqueteros, whose more radical wings were thus isolated and weakened. In all these instances, the notion of the autonomy of the social served not to help the regrouping of mass forces intent on organizing new forms of political action, nor as a way to construct alternative forms of power, but rather as a refusal to confront the issue of power. The clearest theoretical expositions of such tendencies are to be found in the works of Toni Negri and John Holloway. They argue explicitly for the abandonment of power, of the political sphere, on grounds that power corrupts everything since its forms of representing the popular will are intrinsically tainted and distorting; the will of the people can only be legitimately represented within the social sphere. Furthermore, Negri portrays the state as a conservative brake on globalization. Yet neither makes any attempt to construct concrete anti-neoliberal strategies; their prescriptions lead only to the inertia of the social movements. The WSF, for its part, made the need to regulate flows of finance capital one of its founding theses; yet this can only take place—as, for example, in the case of Venezuela—through state action.

## CP

Oil dependence on the Persian Gulf decimates power projection and cost of oil diverts critical military funds

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The **military**’s **reliance on oil from unstable and** often **unfriendly parts of the world creates** **a significant security threat**. Like most consumers, the Pentagon purchases petroleum on the global market. Some of the largest suppliers in this market are **Middle Eastern and North African nations**, many of which **are prone to internal political instability and**/or **tenuous relationships with the American government**. The ten countries with the largest oil reserves, for example, include the likes of Libya, Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Iraq. **This leaves the U.S. vulnerable to petroleum price fluctuations influenced by** the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (**OPEC), which** currently **is chaired by Iran**.6 **Supply concerns are** particularly **acute in forward-deployed military locations**, like Afghanistan and Iraq, **which rely on the safe transportation of fuel through volatile regions to power vehicles and generators**. Military operations account for 75% of all DoD energy consumption, requiring immense amounts of fuel to be brought to theater.7 **U.S. and allied fuel convoys have been targeted by militants** in Iraq, Afghanistan, and **Pakistan, resulting in military and civilian casualties, as well as disruptions in energy supply to critical operations**. In April of 2011, the Taliban warned of a “spring offensive” that would include attacks on “logistical convoys of the foreign invaders” within Afghanistan.8 And in May, militants damaged or destroyed over a dozen fuel tankers taking 15 lives in the process.9 It is estimated that over 3,000 American troops and contractors have been killed while protecting supply convoys in Iraq and Afghanistan.10 As Navy Secretary Ray Mabus has said, “Fossil fuel is the No. 1 thing we import to Afghanistan, and guarding that fuel is keeping the troops from doing what they were sent there to do, to fight or engage local people.”11 **Reliance on oil** can also make **the military less responsive and flexible in its operations**. For instance, the Defense Science Board notes that if the Abrams tanks used in operation Desert Shield had been 50% more fuel efficient, there would have been a greatly reduced need for fuel and related infrastructure which, in turn, would have cut the military’s build-up time by 20%.12 Between 2000 and 2008, DoD’s oil expenditures **increased by almost 500%,** peaking at nearly $18 billion.13 **And estimates show that every $10 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil adds another $1.3 billion to the Pentagon’s fuel budget, swelling the national deficit and diverting resources from critical defense priorities**.14 The rise in spending on fuel by DoD is not solely due to skyrocketing oil prices. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with ever-more energy hungry weapons systems, vehicles and communications devices have increased demand to historic levels. Transporting fuel to military operations sites, often via heavily-protected convoys, also contributes significantly to the cost. Unless DoD makes significant strides to reduce its demand and promote innovative methods of generating and distributing energy, it is on course to spend over $150 billion over the next decade on fuel and electricity. That’s up from the roughly $107 billion the Pentagon spent on energy between 2000 and 2009, at the height of two overseas conflicts.15